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OVER  THE  PAST  FIFTEEN  YEARS  there has been an extraordinary increlase 
in the dispersion of wages among manufacturing industries in the United 
States.  While there were moderate cyclical  swings in the coefficient  of 
variation of hourly wages between  1955 and 1970, there was no obvious 
trend in this  indicator  of  dispersion.'  Yet  between  1970 and  1984, it 
increased by about a third,2 reflecting primarily an increase  in relative 
wages  in high-wage industries.  In a sample of average hourly earnings 
in fifty-seven manufacturing industries (at the three-digit SIC level),  the 
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correlation between wage levels in 1970 and wage changes between  1970 
and  1984 was  0.37.3 Over  the decade  of  the  1970s, for example,  the 
compensation  of  steel  and auto workers  increased  30 and  15 percent 
more, respectively,  than did the sample average.  Union wages rose  1  1 
percent more than did nonunion wages in the U.S.  manufacturing sector 
overall. 
The growing wage differential between high- and low-wage industries 
has been the subject of considerable  debate.  It has been perceived  as a 
major  structural problem  for  three  reasons.  First,  the  fact  that  the 
premiums paid to U.S.  steel and automobile workers over the manufac- 
turing average are substantially higher than the premiums paid to their 
Japanese  counterparts  is  seen  as  a  major  cause  of  declining  U.S. 
international competitiveness  in these  industries.4 Second,  the size  of 
the differential implies substantial costs for workers displaced from high- 
wage  industries and provides  workers with considerable  incentives  to 
avoid displacement by promoting trade protection or industry subsidies. 
Finally, the size of the differential means that workers who are displaced 
from  high-wage  industries  are likely  to  delay  seeking  and accepting 
alternative employment in the hope of being recalled.5 
Because  industries  differ in the  demographic  composition  of  their 
labor force,  the  growing  dispersion  in industrial wages  could  reflect 
shifts  in the wages  associated  with demographic characteristics.6 The 
relationship between  work-force characteristics  and the relative wages 
of workers with these characteristics is fairly straightforward. If workers 
of different ages,  education,  and sex are imperfect  substitutes for one 
3.  Greater than 0.265 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
4.  See,  for example,  Jose  A.  Gomez-Ibanez  and David Harrison, Jr.,  "Imports and 
the Future of the U.S.  Automobile  Industry," Americani Economic  Review,  vol. 72 (May 
1982, Papers  a,d  Proceedinigs,  1981), pp. 319-23;  Richard G. Anderson  and Mordechai 
E.  Kreinen,  "Labour  Costs  in the  American  Steel  and Auto  Industries,"  Thle World 
Econom-y',  vol. 4 (June 1981), pp. 199-208. 
5.  See Wachter and Wascher,  " Laboi Market Policies,"  p. 179. 
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another,  relatively  rapid growth  in  the  availability  of  workers  with 
particular characteristics will lower their relative wages. Industries with 
such workers will experience  a decline  in their relative  wages.  In the 
empirical analysis below,  we take account of these effects in explaining 
relative wage behavior. 
The relationship between  union behavior and wage changes is more 
complex.  Economic  theory  suggests  that  union  workers  will  have 
relatively higher wages than nonunion workers, but not that their relative 
wages  will rise over  time.  Yet  that is precisely  what occurred  during 
the  1970s. In fact,  the wage  increases  contradicted  the  conventional 
wisdom  in a number of different ways.  The accepted  theory  of union 
behavior  in concentrated  industries  suggests  that unions  are able  to 
capture some  excess  profits in the presence  of entry barriers. On this 
theory,  the  1970s, a period  with  unusually  low  rates  of  profitability, 
should not have seen rising relative union wages. Similarly, unions might 
be expected to raise wages in response to increases in labor demand, but 
employment and demand in numerous heavily unionized industries grew 
relatively slowly over the decade.  Finally, unions might be expected  to 
raise wages to capture increased returns from improvements in interna- 
tional  competitiveness,  but  in  numerous  heavily  unionized  sectors, 
competitive  pressures  from abroad increased  over the  1970s. Indeed, 
both  the  steel  and  automobile  industries  were  marked  by  all  three 
characteristics: declining profitability, slower demand growth, and de- 
clining international competitiveness.7  Why, then, did relative wages in 
these sectors rise? 
The existing explanations are unsatisfactory.  One stresses an unwar- 
ranted adherence by union leaders to traditional wage-setting strategies. 
Union wage  agreements  are routinely  specified  in terms of a cost-of- 
living adjustment (COLA) to compensate for inflation, plus a reward for 
higher productivity.  During the  1970s,  however,  supply-side  shocks 
disturbed the traditional relationship between  inflation and warranted 
wage growth.  Real wages  should  have  been  lowered  to  reflect those 
external  shocks  in the  terms  of  trade,  but the  COLA-plus  contracts 
7.  Ann C. Orr  and James A. Orr, "Job Cuts Are Only One Means Firms Use to Counter 
Imports," Monthly Labor Reviewv,  vol.  107 (June 1984), pp. 39-41.  Orr and Orr studied 
adjustment behavior in twenty-five  import-sensitive  industries.  They found that relative 
wage declines were common, but that the automobile and steel industries were anomalies 
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inhibited such  adjustment.  Relative  union wages  therefore  increased 
beyond levels that perfect foresight might have permitted. It is true that 
unanticipated inflation could  temporarily disturb relative  wage differ- 
entials over the course of one contract. But the theory does not explain 
why, when contracts are reopened for negotiation, management is unable 
to obtain recognition that wages have moved beyond the levels originally 
anticipated. 
A second explanation for the rise in relative union wages is that union 
wages  are often  set in three-year  contracts,  whereas  nonunion wages 
are typically  adjusted  annually.8 Average  union  wages  are thus  less 
responsive  to  cyclical  conditions.  But  while  differences  in  cyclical 
responses  may  account  for  short-run  shifts  in  the  union-nonunion 
premium, they are scarcely adequate to account for a decade-long  shift. 
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff make the cyclical interpreta- 
tion somewhat  more plausible by conjecturing that some of the rise in 
the  union  premium  may  be  due  to  the  timing  of  major  collective 
agreements in the 1970s, with more workers covered by contracts signed 
in the relatively  good  years of  1973, 1976, and 1979, than in recession 
years.9  However,  Daniel  J.  B.  Mitchell  has  found  that  the  rate  of 
unemployment  prevailing  at the  time  of  contract  negotiation  has  no 
significant influence  on  the  magnitude of  wage  increases  over  entire 
three-year contracts. '0 Finally, if union wages  are cyclically  unrespon- 
sive,  the  gap  between  union  and  nonunion  wages  should  narrow in 
expansions.  Yet in each year of the expansion  between  1975 and 1979, 
union wages increased more rapidly than did nonunion wages. "I 
8.  For a theoretical  treatment of the cyclical  behavior  of the union-nonunion  wage 
differential, see Ian M. McDonald and Robert M. Solow,  "Wages and Employment  in a 
Segmented  Labour  Market,"  Economic  Discussion  Paper 76 (Department  of  Applied 
Economics,  University of Cambridge, January 1984). 
9.  Richard B.  Freeman and James L.  Medoff,  Whlat Do  Unions  Do?  (Basic  Books, 
1984), p. 54. 
10.  See Daniel J. B. Mitchell,  "Union  Wage Determination: Policy Implications and 
Outlook,"  BPEA, 3.-1978,  pp. 537-82. 
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1974  0.93  1979  0.98  1984  1.00 
Calculated from the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Employment Cost Index for 1976- 
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A third explanation for relative union wage increases  blames quota 
protection.  It is true that removing or constraining foreign competitors 
could reduce the incentives  for domestic  firms to restrain labor costs. 
But while this explanation provides  some insights into some industries 
over some periods,  it is unlikely to account for much of the story over 
the 1970s. The automobile industry received no formal trade protection 
until the voluntary  restraint agreement  with Japan in  1981. The  steel 
industry was protected only intermittently and between  1977 and 1981 
by a trigger price system  that was unlikely to have had a major impact 
on the demand for steel  labor. Moreover,  many industries with rising 
wages received no increases in protection. 
A fourth line of reasoning  suggests  that it is necessary  to examine 
industry-specific  factors in detail. As Wachter and Wascher conclude, 
"Institutional and industry-specific  factors  and information lags prob- 
ably explain some of the inability of firms to adjust relative wages.  One 
example  is  the  steel  industry's  experimental  no-strike  agreement.""2 
Yet, as we will demonstrate, the increased wage dispersion is not simply 
a  story  of  steel  or  automobile  wages.  It  reflects  more  widespread 
phenomena that suggest a common cause  rather than industry-specific 
factors. 
It seems  fair to  conclude  that the literature has  yet  to provide  an 
adequate account  of relative  wage  behavior.'3 This paper attempts to 
provide a more satisfactory explanation. 
The novel  part of the analysis  rests on a theory that predicts rising 
union  wage  differentials  in the  face  of  long-run declines  in demand 
growth. We model a monopoly union maximizing the expected utility of 
its members. Just as monopolists  in the product market take account of 
the demand elasticity for their product in setting its price, so monopoly 
unions take account  of the elasticity  of the derived  demand for union 
labor in making their wage  demands.  The  derived  demand for union 
labor is in turn a function  of the demand for the final product and the 
substitution  possibilities  between  union  labor  and  other  factors  of 
production.  The greater the elasticity  of  substitution,  the greater the 
displacement  of  workers  for a given  wage  increase.  Everything  else 
being equal,  therefore,  union  wages  should  rise  when  a disturbance 
lowers the elasticity of labor demand. Higher union wages could there- 
12.  Wachter and Wascher, "Labor Market Policies,"  p. 189. 
13.  For a similar view,  see Freeman and Medoff,  What Do  Unions Do?,  p. 54. 52  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity,  1:1985 
fore result either from a decline in product demand elasticities  or from a 
decline in substitution elasticities. 
Our explanation  stresses  a decline  in the  substitution  possibilities 
between labor and capital brought about by slower growth. The elasticity 
of labor demand will generally be greater for expansions  in production, 
for which  ex  ante substitution  possibilities  are relevant  (putty-putty), 
than for contractions  of production,  for which  ex  post,  or short-run, 
substitution  possibilities  are relevant  (putty-clay).  In industries  with 
"lumpy"  (that is, large and immobile) capital, disturbances that reduce 
investment  and increase the share of production expected  to be under- 
taken  with  the  existing  capital  lower  the  potential  for  capital-labor 
substitution. 
Given large amounts of long-lived industry-specific capital, therefore, 
declines  in the growth  of  demand could  lower  the  elasticity  of labor 
demand for a substantial period of time. In an extreme  case,  the "end 
game," further investment becomes  permanently undesirable, and only 
ex  post  substitution  possibilities  are relevant.  In such circumstances, 
unions may seek to "harvest"  the quasi-rents earned by capital before 
the  owners  do.'4 We  will  argue that during the  1970s the  U.S.  steel 
industry  was  in an end  game  and that relative  steel  wages  behaved 
accordingly. 
Most U.S.  heavy industries were not in an end game during the 1970s. 
They were, however,  in an overall economy in which long-run economic 
growth had slowed.  To account for their wage behavior,  we will apply 
the more general theory about union wage behavior under conditions of 
slower growth-the  slow game. 
The first section  of the paper outlines  the theories  of end game and 
slow game. The second  section  examines  steel wage behavior as a test 
of end game.  To test  the slow  game hypothesis,  the third section  ex- 
amines wage behavior across fifty-seven  U.S.  manufacturing industries 
over  the last two  decades.  The fourth section  examines  the puzzling 
decline  in total-factor  productivity  growth  across  the  U.S.  economy 
since  1973, and suggests  that productivity  growth  may decline  in the 
face of slow game situations. The paper concludes by considering further 
applications and implications. 
14.  Kathryn Rudie Harrigan and Michael E. Porter, "End-game Strategies for Declin- 
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Wages  in Declining Industries: End Game and Slow Game 
The conventional expectation of a positive relationship between union 
wages  and industry profits ignores  the peculiar impact of  slower  and 
declining growth on union power in industries with substantial amounts 
of long-lived capital. In this section  we contrast union wage responses 
to declining demand in the presence of short- and long-lived capital. We 
analyze union wages in response  to a disturbance requiring permanent 
capacity  reductions-the  end  game-and  in  response  to  declines  in 
capacity  growth-the  slow  game.  We  also  discuss  extensions  and 
qualifications. 
LONG-RUN  WAGE  BARGAINS 
We begin by laying out our model and exploring union wage deter- 
mination in response to declining demand in an industry where capital is 
mobile or short-lived.  In this case  wages  conform to the conventional 
expectation  of a decline  (or no change).  Wages can rise,  however,  in 
response to declining demand in cases where capital is industry-specific 
and long-lived. 
An industry produces  a product that is an imperfect  substitute  for 
those produced in other nations. Production is organized under perfect 
competition  so that while each  domestic  firm faces  a perfectly  elastic 
demand curve, industrywide production can influence the international 
price; that is, the domestic  industry faces  a downward sloping demand 
curve.  Output is produced with two inputs,  labor and capital.  Capital 
markets  are  competitive,  while  the  industry  faces  a  union  with  a 
monopoly over the supply of labor. The union sets the wage rate at which 
labor is supplied to all domestic firms. We follow Ian M. McDonald and 
Robert M. Solow (M-S) in modeling the determination of the union wage 
rate.'5 The union chooses  the point on the industry's aggregate derived 
demand schedule  for labor that maximizes  the expected  utility of its 
members. 
15.  See Ian M. McDonald and Robert M. Solow. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," 
American Economnic  Reviewv,  vol.  71 (December  1981), pp. 896-908.  Most of the results 
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Union membership  is fixed at N. If L members  are employed, each 
member  has a probability  of L/N of a unionized  job with a utility  of U(w) 
and a probability  of  1  -LIN  of a job  elsewhere (or unemployment 
compensation)  with utility U(W),  where w is the economywide  reserva- 
tion wage, which is assumed constant throughout  the analysis.16 The 
expected  utility  function  of any individual  member  is thus 
(1)  -U(w)  +  I1- 
L 
U(,). 
NN 
Assuming  that the aggregate  union expected welfare function is sum- 
mable  over its N members,  the union seeks to maximize 
(2)  L(U(w) -  U), 
where U -  U(w), subject  to the aggregate  derived  demand  schedule  for 
labor  in industry  Y. 
The production technology is given by a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution  (CES) production  function, 
(3)  Y =  [otLP +  (I -  o)KP]I  'P  -  oc '  p c1 
where L and K are labor and capital inputs  and ox  and p are production 
parameters.  The elasticity  of the substitution  between capital  and  labor, 
u, is equal  to 1/(1  - p). 
The first  order  conditions  for each firm's  optimization  are 
(4)  w =  otPY'-PLP- 
and 
(5)  =  (I-a)(K) 
where  r is the rental  price  of capital.  The aggregate  demand  curve  facing 
the entire  industry  is given by 
(6)  P  =  Z Y - l/e(l/P)V,  where Z, v  > 0. 
P is the international  product  price, P  is the constant  elasticity  of demand, 
16. For  a general  equilibrium  analysis  of this  problem,  see John  K. Hill, "Comparative 
Statics  in General  Equilibrium  Models  with  a Unionized  Sector,"  Journal of Inter-national 
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and V is a stochastic demand shifter. 17 For example,  a negative  V could 
represent either a decline in international competitiveness  (foreign firms 
produce substitute goods at lower costs)  or a shift in either domestic  or 
foreign demand. The derived demand for labor can be found by substi- 
tuting equations 3, 5, and 6 into equation 4. In logs this is 
log w = A  +  log [  +  a  r  ] 
-V1  logL  +?  -1V, 
where A is a constant.  The elasticity  of labor with respect  to wages  is 
the Hicksian long-run derived demand elasticity,  qL, which is a function 
of the elasticities  of demand, 1, and substitution, u: 
(8)  n,L  _  (I  -  S)  +  SP9  (8) 
whereS  L  (  is the share of labor. 
~~~r 
The union chooses  Et  and L so  as to  maximize  function  2 subject  to 
equation 7. The optimum condition is 
(9)  U~~~~~~~~ti  (wt)iv' 
(9)  U(u)-U 
The union equates the elasticity  of the gain in utility from employment 
in the  industry  (with respect  to  the  wage  rate) with  the  elasticity  of 
derived demand,  m. Thus as with monopoly  in the product market, 
crucial consideration for the monopoly union is  . 
Consider now a permanent inward shift in the product demand curve 
due to the availability of cheaper foreign or domestic substitutes, changes 
in tastes,  or reductions  in income.  This  shock  does  not  change  the 
derived elasticity of demand for labor shown in equilibrium condition 9 
for a given wage rate. Given the specification of the M-S utility function, 
the CES  production  function,  and the  demand  shock,  therefore,  the 
wage rate sought by the union will remain unchanged.  Wages remain 
constant,  and,  since  the rental rate is fixed,  the adjustment takes  the 
form of an equiproportional reduction in labor and capital. If, however, 
17.  Commercial policy (for example,  quotas) oI changes in international competitive- 
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inward demand shifts alter the elasticity  of derived demand, they could 
reduce both wages and the capital-labor ratio. 18 
A central assumption  of this model is mobile or short-lived capital. 
The decline in the demand curve does not alter the substitution possibil- 
ities  between  capital and labor. Ex  post  and ex  ante capital is putty- 
putty.  Capital  must  always  earn  a  normal  rate  of  return  and  will, 
therefore,  be reduced,  along with employment,  until the marginal unit 
of  capital  earns  the  economywide  rental rate.  If capital is  extremely 
short-lived in relation to the contract period, the use of the putty-putty 
assumption may be valid, but what is the response to a declining demand 
curve in industries such as steel,  oil, and shipbuilding, where capital is 
long-lived  and industry-specific?  Over significant ranges of output, the 
response  to declines  in demand in such cases  will simply be a higher 
level  of  unutilized  capacity.  Under  these  circumstances,  therefore, 
unless  scrapped, capital will only "leave"  the industry as it wears out. 
Under such conditions,  a shock that reduces  the desired capital stock 
could  appreciably  lower  the  elasticity  of  demand for labor and raise 
wages.  Thus,  in  the  face  of  common  downward  shifts  in  demand, 
depending  upon the  nature of  the capital  stock,  wages  could  behave 
differently in different industries, and the dispersion in wages could rise. 
THE  END  GAME 
Consider  an  extreme  example  in  which  capital  equipment,  once 
installed,  is infinitely long-lived,  and in which the union is faced with a 
permanent reduction  in the product demand curve.  Even  if the union 
were to set wages as low as -w,  the industry would not add new capital. 
Scrapping, however,  will occur only when revenue falls below variable 
costs. 
18.  This conforms to the conventional  expectation  of a positive  association  between 
demand shifts and wages.  See,  for example,  Oded Galor, "Labor Union Objectives  and 
Optimal Wage Policy in a Dynamic Setting,"  in Three Essays  in Economic  Theory (Ph.D. 
dissertation,  Columbia University,  May 1984). See also Michael A. Salinger, "Tobin's q, 
Unionization,  and the Concentration-Profits Relationship,"  Rand Joiurn1al of Econlomics, 
vol.  15 (Summer 1984), pp. 159-70. Salinger argues that in imperfectly competitive product 
markets where firms earn normal profits, unions will be forced to accept wage cuts so as 
to insure that firms will continue  investing  in the industry (that is,  the value of the firm 
relative to replacement costs-Tobin's  q-remains  above unity). Colihn  Laurii-encce  and Robesrt  Z. Laivrence  57 
A Special Case.  Before proceeding to a general analysis of end game, 
we  examine  the  special  case  where  ex  post  there are no  substitution 
possibilities  between  capital  and  labor  (u  =  0)-that  is,  there  is  a 
Leontief technology  for each plant in the industry. If output is varied ex 
post,  it must be done by changing factors in fixed proportions. Assume 
that output,  labor, and capital are measured  in units such that at the 
initial equilibrium, one unit of capital and one of labor are required to 
produce one unit of output. Thus both output and labor input can be read 
off along the X axis as illustrated in figure 1. Initially, facing a derived 
demand curve DL, the union  sets  a wage  wt,*  resulting in Q* units of 
output being produced, with L* and K* as inputs (point A). As indicated 
in the lower panel, the price will be P*, the price associated  with Q* on 
the product demand curve D*. Of course, the union could choose a point 
like B on the short-run curve D*BL* , but to do so would be to inhibit any 
further investment in the industry. 
Suppose  there  is  an  unanticipated  permanent  decline  in  product 
demand, shifting the demand curve to DI .19  Suppose further that firms 
now  find that capacity  expansion  has a negative  net present  value.20 
Since no investment  will take place,  higher wages have no opportunity 
cost  in the form of reduced investment.  The union now selects  a point 
on the kinked short-run derived demand curve DS  CL*. Along the segment 
CL*, all plants will remain open, whereas on segment DIC, some plants 
will be forced to shut down.21  Along CL*, the curve is peifectly  inelastic 
until  C,  at  which  point  the  wage  bill  exhausts  total  revenue  for  all 
homogeneous  plants. At wages  higher than w, (that is, point C),  some 
plants will shut down, and wages forthe entire industry exhaust revenues. 
If the union chooses  C, all plants will remain in business,  the wage rate 
lii  will be equal to the price PI, and the union will have appropriated all 
the profits without losing  any employment.  For owners  of plants,  the 
return has been reduced to zero. Thus in this case,  Tobin's q, the ratio 
of market value to replacement cost,  would fall to zero. 
Consider  the  response  to  a  second  unanticipated  but  permanent 
inward shift in demand to D2. Assume that, prior to the disturbance, the 
19.  Note that the greater 1 is, the less the price will fall for any shift in V. 
20.  This is a sufficient condition to guarantee that no further investment will occur. 
21.  The elasticity of segment DIC will be equal to the elasticity of product demand,  , 
since unions obtain all revenues,  and S =  1 (see equation 8). 58  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Figure 1.  End Game with Leontief Production Technology 
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union had chosen  wage  rate wvj.  Now  the  new  kinked demand curve 
facing the union will be DIDL*.  The union could choose  a point like D, 
reducing wages  to w2 without a loss  of employment.  The price would 
decline to P2. If the union maintained wages at wl, it would lose FL* jobs 
as plants closed down. In general, depending on the degree of union risk 
aversion and the elasticity  of product demand, the end of the end game 
could involve  wage reductions accompanied  by the possibility  of shut- 
downs and layoffs. 
More generally, when some elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor is possible  ex  post,  union  wage  demands  are likely  to  be 
bounded by the shutdown point. Once that point is reached, and plants 
are being  closed  or threatened  with  closure,  labor demand  becomes 
more elastic, and wage rates are reduced. 
Thus the response  of union wages to a sequence  of demand declines 
could well go through two distinct phases.  In the first, the beginning of 
the  end game,  declining  elasticity  of  derived  demand  induces  higher 
wages and is associated  with a drop in Tobin's q; in the secona,  the end 
of the end game, declining revenue (and the prospect of plant closures, 
which again raise the labor demand elasticity) induces wage reductions. 
Ceteris paribus, the more lumpy and long-lived  the original capital is, 
the more dramatic the "scooping"  of profit in the first phase is likely to 
be. 
End Game with Ex Post  Substitution.  We now investigate  the end 
game  theory  with  a more general  specification.  We  assume  that the 
permanent  decline  in  demand  leaves  the  long-run  capital  stock  K* 
unchanged. Firms may, however,  still vary employment levels according 
to the production function,  equation 3.2  The new derived demand for 
labor for a fixed level of capital K* is 
(10)  logw  = A  +  3-IV +  l  13log [oLP +  (I-co)K*P]I/P 
+  (p-1)logL. 
The equilibrium condition  is found by maximizing the expected  utility 
22.  K* remains fixed, since, given a CES production function, no matter how high the 
wage, some level of employment is still marginally profitable, with the value of the marginal 
product covering  at least  the  wage.  If all firms are equally  efficient,  there  will  be  no 
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function  2 subject to equation  10. It is given  by equation 9. The new 
elasticity of derived demand facing the union is 
(11)  L~?s MaLP  (1  0c-)K*P]  0. 
otcLP  +  13(1c-o)K*P 
The change in elasticities owing to the decline in product demand with 
industry-specific capital can be found by subtracting the long-run elas- 
ticity  qL  from  qS.  Evaluating the change at the initial capital-labor ratio, 
this is 
( 1  2)  an  =  S*(1  -  S*)(p -  U)2 < 0  (12)  ri 
~~~S*U 
?  13(1 S*) 
where S* is the share of labor evaluated  at w*/r*. Equation 12 demon- 
strates that the derived demand elasticity  for labor shrinks due to the 
reduced possibility of substitution between capital and labor. Except in 
the case of corner solutions, there is no monotonic relationship between 
1,  u,  and &q. The intuitive reason is that increases  in the ratio of the 
wage to the rental price of capital induce both substitution and contrac- 
tion effects.  As  long as u  >  1, the lower  u is,  the more inelastic  the 
derived demand curve will be. 
Equilibrium, described  in figure 2, is initially at point A. The subse- 
quent shift in wages can be decomposed  into two stages.  The first, the 
elasticity  effect,  would occur  in response  to all types  of disturbances 
that fix the capital stock.  Since the actual capital stock is fixed, the new 
demand  curve  is  less  elastic  (equation  12) evaluated  at the  previous 
equilibrium. Purely as a result of this effect,  therefore,  the union wage 
would shift from A to B along the new demand curve D'AB,  and wages 
would change by w' -  v*. The second, the demand effect,  is the inward 
shift in the less  elastic  derived demand curve resulting from the fall in 
demand per se. The demand curve D'(V*, r*, K*) shifts to D"(VI, r*, K*) 
for V* >  V1.  The equilibrium shifts from B to a point like C. This shift in 
wages is w' - w". 
Overall wages will rise in end game if the elasticity  effect dominates 
the  demand  contraction  effect.  When the elasticity  of  substitution  is 
unity, the Cobb-Douglas case, the labor demand elasticity is not affected 
by  shifts  resulting from demand contraction.  In this  case,  therefore, Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  61 
Figure 2.  End Game with Ex Post Substitution Possibilitiesa 
Wage 
U' 
w  C 
U2~~~A  U 
D" (V,, r*, K*)  D' (V*, r* K  D (V*, r*) 
L*  Employment 
a.  V*>  v1. 
wages  will rise unambiguously,  since  labor demand elasticity  is only 
subject to the elasticity effect. 
Analytically, the shift from pointA to point Cis found by differentiating 
the optimum condition,  equation 9, and using equations  10, 11, and 12, 
which yields: 
(13)  d log w  S*(1  -  S*)(3  -  c)2  + Lf'(L) 
dV  -  [qL  +  R - 1 - Lf'(L)] 
where f'(L)  -L  , and R  =  -  ((  , or union relative risk aversion. 62  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Second  order conditions  imply that R +?qL>I  andf'(L)<O,  so that the 
denominator in equation 13 is positive.23 The first term of the numerator, 
the elasticity effect,  is always positive,  and the second,  the contraction 
effect,  is negative or zero. Except for the special cases  where uc=  0 and 
0  0, the sign of equation 13 is ambiguous.24 
How  do  the  initial factor  shares  affect  the  change  in wages?  We 
differentiate equation  11 with respect to the share of capital for a given 
wage-rental ratio and obtain 
(1hla)  -Tls  PU(1  - S)S(U -  ) 
I__t  [SU  +  3(1-S)]2 
The change in -qS  and hence wages will depend on the size of 1 relative 
to u. If 1 >  u, then for any given initial wage-rental ratio, the higher the 
share of capital, the larger the wage increases  in end game.  When a  is 
high in end game, union power in capital-intensive  plants will increase. 
Although the increase in price caused by higher union wages leads to a 
sharp reduction in revenues  for high 1, it is capital that bears the brunt 
of this revenue  loss.  Moreover,  for low  u,  the capital-intensive  plant 
cannot easily increase the capital-labor ratio. Thus labor secures higher 
wages without significant loss in employment.  If the decline in interna- 
tional competitiveness  is associated with arise in a due to the introduction 
of  new  products,  capital-intensive  plants  with  lumpiness  and  little 
possibility  of  substitution  between  capital  and labor will  experience 
greater wage increases in end game. 
THE  SLOW  GAME 
The end game scenario  analyzed  above  is a special  case  of slower 
demand growth. In this section,  we set the model in a growth context to 
23.  The second order condition is explicitly derived in Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. 
Lawrence,  "The  Determination  of  Wages  in  Declining  Industries:  An  Endgame  and 
Slowgame  Interpretation,"  First  Boston  Working Paper  Series,  FB-85-10  (Columbia 
University,  1985). If R> 1, then the condition is necessary  but not sufficient.  If R< 1, the 
condition is sufficient. Figure 2 is drawn forf'(L)<O. 
24.  A Cobb-Douglas technology implies thatf '(L) = O  so that wages will unequivocally 
S (l  S*)(B -  1)2 
r-ise  by 
P3(.qL  +  R -  1)  dV in this case. Colin Lawrence and Robest Z. Lawrence  63 
illustrate the more general wage response to declines in demand growth. 
We  call  this  scenario  the  slow  game.  An  extremely  simple  model 
illustrates our argument.25 
Again  we  emphasize  the  difference  between  ex  post  and ex  ante 
substitution possibilities.  If ex post substitution possibilities  are limited, 
and  capital  is  long-lived,  unions  making  wage  demands  have  to  be 
concerned primarily about capital-labor substitution in new investment. 
The higher the share of new capacity in production, the more elastic the 
derived demand for labor. Thus capacity  growth and the elasticity  of 
demand  for  labor are  likely  to  be  positively  related.  An  exogenous 
decline  in capacity  expansion  could,  therefore,  induce a higher union 
wage.  We assume  that ex  ante the production  technology  is a putty- 
putty CES function.  Ex post, however,  capital must be used with labor 
in fixed proportions. We also assume that capital does not depreciate.26 
At any time the production opportunity set facing the firm  is nonhomo- 
thetic. Production involves the use of existing capital in a fixed proportion 
to labor and of new capital in a variable proportion to labor. Along a 
given steady-state  path, with no improvements  in productivity,  capital 
and labor would grow at the same rate given the wage-rental ratio. The 
fact that ex  post  proportions  are fixed implies  that unions  in existing 
plants could raise their wages up to a point without losing employment. 
However,  by so doing they affect future employment  opportunities for 
new members, since firms could respond by using more capital-intensive 
production methods. 
We use subscripts with zero to indicate existing capital and labor, Ko 
and Lo, and the output,  YO,  that it produces.  We use  K, L,  and  Y to 
designate new  capital,  employment,  and output,  respectively.  The ex 
ante production technology  is described  in equation 3. The firm's first 
order conditions  for new  plants  are described  by  equations  4 and 5. 
Output  in existing plants is fixed at YO,  as are the production coefficients .7 
25.  A complete dynamic model would of course incorporate heterogeneity of the union 
membership,  rates of  time  preference,  and differences  in  specific  and general  human 
capital. 
26.  In the presence of depreciation, unions have to be concerned about substitution as 
a result of gross investment.  But depreciation does not change the qualitative nature of the 
results. 
27.  It is relatively  simple to allow  for the possibility  of  some  substitution  between 
capital and labor, as well as to incorporate endogenous  utilization of capital services  in 
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In any period,  aggregate  output, Y, is produced  with  old and  new capital 
and  labor;  thus 
(14)  Y =  Y0  +  Y; L = Lo + L; K = Ko + K. 
The demand  curve facing  the industry  is: 
(15)  log  Pd -  log Y0  =  g  -  3(log  P  -  log P0). 
In the steady state, capital, labor, and output  would all grow  at g, while 
P and  wir would  remain  constant. 
The aggregate  derived demand  for labor during  the decision period 
can be found  by using  equations 14  and 15  and the first  order  conditions 
4 and 5: 
(16)  Ld  =  Lo +  S(Yo +  Y)-110e(11f9  Yw-I Y01f/P0, 
where  S is the share  of labor  defined  in equation  8. The unions  choose L 
and w to maximize  L(U(w)  -  U) subject  to equation 16. The first  order 
equilibrium  condition  is described  by 
(17)  U'(I)  tv  =  Sf3+  V(1-S)U, 
U(W) -U 
where V =  g(Y0!Y)=  (Y/Y). The right-hand side of equation 17 denotes 
the  derived  demand  elasticity.  It  depends  on the share  of output  produced 
by new plants, V, and the long-run  Hicksian  elasticity, qL.  If all output 
is produced  by new investment  (V =  1), then the aggregate  elasticity is 
the Hicksian elasticity  [qL  =  S  +  (1  -  S)o].  On the other hand, in end 
game, there is no new investment  (V = 0), and the elasticity  will be Sf. 
Figure  3 traces out this relationship.  At point  A, all output  is produced 
by new plants, while at point B an end game situation has occurred. 
Figure 4 shows how different values of V would affect the derived 
demand  for labor  schedules. As V rises, the entire  schedule shifts to the 
right, and the elasticity increases, since a greater share of plants will 
now have an ex ante  elasticity  of substitution  equal  to cr.  In the end game 
situation,  the elasticity will decline to Sf.28 
28.  Note that there is a range of wage increases  in which the unions can extract some 
profits without any plant shutdowns. See figure 1 for a full explanation of this phenomenon. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  65 
Figure 3.  Derived Demand Elasticity with Economic Growtha 
Derived demand 
elasticity  (,qL) 
SP +  (I -S)aX -  -  - --A 
lopeI 
S  +(1-S)r?-  A 
SP' 
0  1  V 
a.  Note that along the path BA, the wage-rental ratio is being held constant. 
Wage Determination  under Slow Game.  Consider an economy  with 
the demand for Ygrowing at V*, with V* equal to the proportion of new 
plants each period, as depicted in figure 5. Equilibrium is at point E. If 
V* falls to V1, the derived demand schedule  will shift inward to D(VI). 
D(V,) will be less elastic than D(V*). Any increase in wages will lead to 
a smaller reduction in employment growth in comparison with the higher 
growth scenario. What wage will the union choose?  There is a substitu- 
tion effect and a contraction effect.  The substitution effect alone would 
lead unions to push wages up to ws (equilibrium is at point F), whereas 
the contraction effect  alone would reduce both wage and employment 
growth. In figure 5, the combined impact of the two effects is at point G, 
where wages have risen from w* to wu.  Of course, the contraction effect 
could dominate the substitution effect,  and wages could fall below  w*. 
To establish what happens to wages  in the new steady  state,  we fully 
differentiate the equilibrium condition (equation 9) and the labor demand 66  Brookin7gs  Papers oni  Economic Activity,  1:1985 
Figure 4.  Derived Demand Labor Schedules with Growtha 
w/r 
VI 
VI 
Aggregate  labor 
a.  V,>  VI >  VO. 
schedule  (equation  16). Under  the assumption  that u  =  1 (the Cobb- 
Douglas case),  the solution is 
(18)  d log w 
_  -(1-  S)  < 0,  dV  L(-L  +  R-  1) 
(19)  dlogL  (l-S)  +  1>0. 
dV  (L?+  R-  1) 
As long as the sufficient condition for equilibrium holds [(-qL  +  R) >  1], 
then a slowdown in growth will unambiguously lead to higher wages and 
lower  employment  growth.  Thus,  ex  ante  putty-putty  Cobb-Douglas 
technology  and McDonald-Solow  union preferences  guarantee that the 
elasticity effect dominates the contraction effect. In other circumstances, 
the solution is ambiguous. 
The reader should be aware how similar slow game is to end game in 
terms of union wage bargaining. However,  slow game has the appeal of 
symmetry. In the presence of unions, wages could fall in an industry that 
experiences  an expansion in demand for its product. Colin Lawrence and Robe rt Z. Lawrence  67 
Figure 5.  The Slow Game Scenario and Wage Determination 
Wage 
u  t  U2  A  E 
D(V)  D(V*) 
L  D'(K*, V*) 
L*  Employment 
QUALIFICATIONS  AND  EXTENSIONS 
We have demonstrated that an end game can result from a decline in 
international competitiveness.  Similar effects  could  result from other 
shocks,  in particular, a rise in the cost  of capital (or a complementary 
factor such as energy), or a decline in capital productivity (perhaps due 
to regulatory or environmental  requirements,  or to a shift in relative 
prices that requires experimentation with new technologies).  Elsewhere, 
we have demonstrated that an exogenous  decline in the productivity of 
capital will lead to more inelastic  derived demand for labor, providing 
that u >  29  That decline could also induce precisely  the end game or 
29.  See Lawrence and Lawrence,  "The Determination of Wages."  In the event that C 
>  r, but ar  <  ,83, where 8, bounded between 0 and 1, measures the decline in productivity, 
the derived demand will become more inelastic. 68  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
slow  game results described  here.  Since,  if u  >  1,  the decline  in the 
productivity of capital induces an outward shift in the derived demand 
for labor that reinforces the elasticity effect,  regardless of union prefer- 
ences,  wages will rise in response to the shock.30 
Heterogeneous  Workers.  In the model the assumption  was that all 
workers had an equal chance of employment.  In the real world, workers 
are typically hired and fired according to seniority rules, and they face 
different probabilities of layoff.3' In addition, depending on their indus- 
try-specific human capital, workers may face different opportunity costs 
if displaced.  Preferences,  age,  and  seniority  could  be  systematically 
related.32 By  changing union membership,  growth could alter the age 
and seniority of the median union voter as well as the elasticity of labor 
demand. 
Positive  Investment.  The end game scenario above  suggested  zero 
investment in the face of an inward shift in the demand curve. In reality, 
investment  may continue in many end game situations.  Firms are, after 
all, heterogeneous.  Some  may adopt strategies  to survive  and expand 
even  though  aggregate  production  stagnates.  The  nature  of  capital 
investment is varied as well. A firm that does not wish to expand capacity 
may  still need  to invest  in maintenance.  Indeed,  a shock  that makes 
investment  in one type of capital impossible  may raise the demand for 
other types of capital (but still lower the elasticity of demand for labor). 
In a three-input homothetic  production function with immobile capital, 
mobile  capital,  and labor, an end game situation  will lead to positive 
mobile capital investment  if the substitution effect  dominates  the con- 
traction effect.  In the Cobb-Douglas  cases,  positive  investment  will be 
observed if d < S(1 -  S).33 
30.  To ascertain the impact on the change in -q, differentiate equation 12 with respect 
to 8  % A[(1 -  o)/o] at the initial w*/r* ratio and obtain 
0&q  t  u*  S*(1 -  S*)(cr  -  P8)(Cr  -  3) 
06  r*  Scr  +  8(1-S*) 
Evaluate this for values of cr, 3, or 8 and obtain the results in the text. 
31.  For an analysis of union response  to a decrease  in international competitiveness 
using a model  in which  union membership  is  determined  endogenously,  see  Gene  M. 
Grossman,  "International Competition and the Unionized  Sector,"  Discussion  Papers in 
Economics,  no. 29 (Woodrow Wilson School,  Princeton, New Jersey, May 1982). 
32.  See Gregg Easterbrook, "Voting for Unemployment,"  The  Atlantic, vol. 251 (May 
1983), pp. 31-44. 
33.  A proof of this can be found in Lawrence  and Lawrence,  "The Determination of 
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Finally,  in the real world, disturbances  are rarely clearly labeled as 
permanent  or temporary.  Uncertainty  may  induce  firms to  continue 
investment but at a slower pace, while workers raise their wage demands 
but do not scoop profits entirely. 
Our very simple model grants workers monopoly  power while firms 
are perfectly competitive.  But the end game theory does not rest on the 
assumption  of  asymmetric  information.  Both  management  and labor 
perceive  accurately  that once  new investment  is no longer viable,  the 
power of management erodes  because  it can no longer threaten to use 
less labor-intensive production methods or not to build new plants. 
In more complex  real-world cases  of bilateral monopolies  or oligop- 
olies, shifts that lower the demand elasticity for labor should raise labor's 
bargaining power,  but the analysis would necessarily  have to be differ- 
ent.34 In particular,  a  management  with  high profits  may  be  able  to 
withstand a strike and thus exact  concessions.  On the other hand, a 
management in a precarious position  may be able to do likewise.  More 
detailed examination of the behavior of owners and management under 
economic  conditions  such  as those  prevailing in the  1970s may yield 
further insights into the wage determination process.35 
Work  Rules.  In the model just considered,  the union's utility func- 
tion was specified purely in terms of employment and wages.  However, 
instead of seeking higher wages, the union might seek to improve working 
conditions even at the cost of lower productivity.  Thus working condi- 
tions  would  enter  the  utility  function  positively  and  the  production 
function  negatively.  In this case,  it is  straightforward to  show  that a 
decline  in the demand elasticity  as a result of end game will result in 
demands for altered work rules in addition to higher wages.  Declining 
worker productivity may well be a concomitant of end game. 
Testing  the End Game: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1970-84 
Relative steel wages in the United States over the past fifteen years 
have conformed closely  to the forecast  of the end game theory: in the 
34.  See McDonald and Solow,  "Wage Bargaining and Employment." 
35.  In the presence  of (physical)  depreciation  the analysis  becomes  more complex, 
since it clearly has a much stronger intertemporal aspect.  With fixed coefficients  ex post, 
in  the  end  game,  as  plants  wear  out,  employment  declines.  Nonetheless,  since  by 
assumption new investment is not profitable even at the opportunity wage, the union gains 
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1970s, a period of  stagnant demand and investment,  relative  average 
hourly  wages  increased  by  27  percent;  between  1982 and  1984,  in 
response  to deep declines  in demand and plant closures,  they declined 
by 12 percent. 
Several  characteristics  of  the  U.S.  steel  industry make it a prime 
candidate for an end game interpretation of its wage  behavior.  First, 
most workers in the traditional integrated steel industry belong to the 
United Steelworkers Trade Union. Second, exit barriers are substantial: 
steel  is produced  in large plants that are highly capital-intensive  and 
long-lived.  And, third, during the 1970s, the prospects  for the industry 
deteriorated markedly but not sufficiently to induce major plant closures 
or employment declines. 
The  industry's  problems  since  1970 stem  from  a  combination  of 
demand and supply-side factors. The ratio of steel consumption to GNP 
has  gradually declined  in  mature industrial economies  as  they  have 
passed through the phase of building steel-intensive  infrastructure such 
as ports,  bridges,  power  plants,  railroads, and highways.36 There has 
also been a secular trend toward the substitution of alternative materials 
such as aluminum and plastic for steel. During the 1970s, slow worldwide 
economic  growth,  which  reduced  investment  in heavy  industry,  and 
high energy prices,  which accelerated  the substitution of lighter alter- 
native materials, reinforced the trend toward declining steel use. Despite 
the  36 percent  increase  in  U.S.  GNP  between  1970 and  1980,  steel 
consumption in the United States actually decreased by 2 percent. 
The large integrated U.S.  steel producers were unsuccessful  even in 
maintaining their share of this shrinking market. In 1960, foreign pro- 
ducers and U.S.  mini-mills produced 5 percent of the steel consumed in 
the United States; by late 1982, their share of the U.S.  market had grown 
to almost 40 percent.37 By the early 1970s, the technological  superiority 
enjoyed by big U.S.  steelmakers, especially during the 1950s, had eroded. 
Worldwide declining transportation costs and falling real iron ore prices 
had also  reversed  the longstanding  U.S.  advantage  in raw materials. 
Even  if U.S.  steel  wages  had been  at Japanese  levels,  Japanese  steel 
would  have  been  cheaper.38 It became  increasingly  obvious  that the 
36.  See Donald F. Barnett and Louis Schorsch,  Steel:  Upheaval  in a Basic  Industuy 
(Ballinger, 1983). 
37.  Ibid., p. 79. 
38.  See the estimates of manhours per ton in Barnett and Schorsch,  Steel,  p. 123. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  71 
construction  of new integrated steel facilities  in the United  States was 
not a viable proposition.  It was  cheaper either to build such plants in 
newly industrializing countries or to build mini-mills in the United States. 
These judgments  were  shared by expert  analysts,  participants in the 
stock market, and, as revealed by their behavior (if not their statements), 
steel management. 
According  to Donald  F.  Barnett and Louis  Schorsch,  for example, 
"No  reasonable  set  of  assumptions  can  be  selected  to  generate  an 
attractive rate of return on investment  for new  integrated plants.... 
Even with state-of-the-art techniques,  labor requirements in integrated 
facilities  are roughly twice  those  of mini-mill operations.  .  .  . Massive 
modernization in its purest form-the  construction  of greenfield plants 
of the minimum efficient scale-would  not improve their competitiveness 
against their principal foreign competitors.  .  .  . The financing costs  [of 
building such a plant would]  swamp the efficiency  benefits."39 Robert 
W. Crandall concurred with this view,  "Given the labor-intensity in the 
production of steel and in the construction of steelmaking facilities,  the 
United  States  is not in a favorable  position  to  expand  steel  capacity 
through the construction of new integrated works.  "40 
The stock market's appraisal matched that of these experts: Tobin's 
q, the ratio of market value to replacement costs,  for the steel industry 
had been less than unity as early as 1960; by 1970, q for steel had fallen 
to 0.3 (see table 1), and throughout the decade it languished at or below 
that level.  Steel  investment  patterns also  matched  these  perceptions. 
The U.S.  industry had expanded  capacity  during the 1950s from 90 to 
136 million tons  and had engaged  in considerable  modernization  and 
capital-deepening  during the  1960s; but during the  1970s, investment 
was devoted  primarily to the maintenance  of existing plants.41 In 1980 
the industry had the same capacity  that it had in 1970, while between 
1970 and 1980, as officially measured,  its gross capital stock declined 3 
percent. The actual rate of disinvestment  is probably understated, since 
the official capital stock  data include  both government-mandated  ex- 
penditures, which do not increase capacity,  and nonsteel  investments, 
39.  Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
40.  Robert W. Crandall, The U.S.  Steel Industiy  in Recurrent Crisis: Policy  Options 
in a Competitive World (Brookings Institution,  1981), p. 91. 
41.  See William T. Hogan,  World Steel in the 1980s. A Case of Survival (D.C.  Heath, 
Lexington Books,  1983), p. 92; and Barnett and Schorsch,  Steel,  p. 148. <  00  ooooor-  o  OOcoo  o  oa 
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which have been increasing in recent years and constituted  roughly 30 
percent of investment by steel firms in 1980.42 
Still,  although  new  investment  in  steel  had become  unprofitable, 
variable costs  could usually be covered,  and economic  considerations 
still justified  operating existing  plants.  In addition,  management  was 
uncertain about the future path of steel demand and tried to keep existing 
plants  operating  with  a view  to  meeting  shortages  in the  event  of  a 
resurgence in demand. In his 1981  study, Crandall  concluded that existing 
capacity would remain relatively intact. He argued, "The best existing 
U.S.  mills have  operating and incremental capital costs  that are very 
close  to the costs  of operating and amortizing the capital investment  of 
new mills in eastern Asia. Therefore, while new mills are not likely to be 
built in the United States in the foreseeable  future, at current exchange 
rates the most efficient U.S.  mills should have little difficulty defending 
their home  markets from major increases  in import penetration  from 
even the most efficient exporting countries."43 And he predicted,  "The 
U.S.  steel industry will lose capacity gradually over the next decade [the 
1980s] but this loss will be no more than 10 percent even without trade 
protection. "44 
Over the  1970s, therefore,  circumstances  in the steel  industry con- 
formed  to those  of phase  one  of the end game.  Shocks  had radically 
reduced desired investment  but had not led to substantial reductions in 
capacity  or employment.  As  indicated  in table  1, capacity  peaked  in 
1977, when it was only about 3 percent above  the 1970 level,  and then 
declined gently until 1984, when there was a precipitous fall. Similarly, 
employment remained fairly stable, ranging from 549,000 to 627,000jobs 
between  1970 and 1979. 
The end game theory predicts that the following  circumstances  will 
accelerate union wage demands: substantial amounts of fixed plant with 
limited prospects  for either growth or scrappage; workers unlikely to 
lose  either potential or actual employment  opportunities if their wages 
were increased; management without the credible threat of investing in 
new,  more capital-intensive  plants or of shutting down the old plants. 
The steel  industry, as described,  conforms  exactly  with the end game 
model. Its relative wages behaved as predicted. 
42.  Barnett and Schorsch,  Steel,  p. 146. 
43.  Crandall, The U.S.  Steel Industry, p. 92. 
44.  Ibid., p. 153. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  75 
Discussions  with members of the steel industry during the 1970s would 
have elicited fierce denials that steel was actually in an end game. The 
conventional  explanation  for  steel  wage  behavior  is  institutionalist. 
Management's  fears  of a strike and its impact on import penetration 
induced it to provide an extremely  generous  contract in 1974 in return 
for a no-strike pledge.  In subsequent contracts,  it is said, disputes over 
union leadership induced excessive  wage demands.  But it is preferable 
to examine the actual behavior of both the union and management rather 
than their rationalizations about their behavior. Certainly union members 
felt that there was little relationship between their wages and their jobs; 
they  perceived  that  the  derived  demand  curve  for  labor was  highly 
inelastic.  And management,  apparently,  was forced to accede  to their 
wage demands. 
Acquisition patterns in the 1970s belie management denials that steel 
was  in the  end  game.  Declining  capital-intensive  industries  become 
"cash cows."  They generate cash flow but not new investment  oppor- 
tunities. Our end game theory describes union efforts to milk those cows. 
However,  management may seek to milk the cows before the unions do. 
Because their large depreciation expenses  had increased their cash flow, 
steel firms became  the target of conglomerate  acquisitions  in the late 
1960s. Several  major companies  were acquired by much smaller con- 
glomerates-Jones  and Laughlin by Ling-Temco-Vought,  Youngstown 
by Lykes,  and Sharon by NVF.  Steel  management  responded  in the 
early  1970s by  beginning  to  diversify  in  earnest.  By  1982, with  its 
acquisition of Marathon Oil, U.S.  Steel could more accurately be called 
U.S.  Oil.4s 
Another alternative hypothesis blames the rising steel wage premium 
on trade protection.  In principle,  trade protection  could  explain  why 
relative steel  wages  increased,  since  protection  in the form of quotas 
may lower the product demand elasticity  and thus the derived demand 
for labor. And in fact steel was subject to quota protection between  1969 
and 1974 in the form of a voluntary restraint agreement with Japanese 
and European exporters that limited exports  to the United  States to a 
target of  14 million  tons  in  1969 and  somewhat  higher  amounts  in 
subsequent years.  However,  according to Crandall, "Most  studies  of 
45.  U.S. Steel began to diversify into chemicals in the late 1960s. Barnett and Schorsch, 
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this program have found that it raised prices and limited imports through 
1972 but was not binding thereafter.  "46  Therefore, when the Experimen- 
tal Negotiating  Agreement  (the novel  no-strike agreement) was signed 
in 1974, U.S.  steel  enjoyed  no formal or informal protection  arrange- 
ments. The second bout of protection occurred with the 1978 implemen- 
tation of the trigger price system, which placed a floor on prices at which 
imports could enter the U.S.  market. At price levels  below  the trigger 
price, such a system makes the derived labor demand curve less elastic 
by  eliminating  foreign  supply  responses.  Above  the  trigger price,  it 
leaves  supply  unaffected.  According  to  Crandall,  in the  absence  of 
trigger prices U.S.  steel prices would have averaged at most 2.7 percent 
less than those recorded in 1979. Thus the trigger price system is unlikely 
to have exerted a major influence on wages. 
Japanese  steel  exports  to the  United  States  remained suspiciously 
close to 6 million tons each year between  1978 and 1981. Although never 
formally announced,  it is likely that this reflected an implicit voluntary 
restraint agreement by the Japanese.  Nonetheless,  since  most  steel  is 
fairly homogeneous,  alternative sources of supplies make it unlikely that 
this protection materially affected the derived demand for union labor. 
In summary,  protection  may have  facilitated,  but is unlikely  to have 
induced,  the major rise in relative steel wages  in the  1970s. It was too 
small, intermittent, and, in the case of the trigger prices, unlikely to have 
affected appreciably the demand elasticity for steel labor. 
THE  END  OF  THE  END  GAME 
Beginning in 1980 several developments  moved steel from the " scoop- 
ing" phase of the end game, in which wages rise, to the end of the end 
game, in which they fall. The second energy shock accelerated the move 
to small cars and lighter materials. The subsequent decline in oil prices 
reduced the demand for oil-drilling equipment. Back-to-back recessions 
in 1980 and 1982 and the post-1980 rise in the U.S.  dollar sharply cut 
steel  employment  and  capacity.  In  1984,  despite  two  full  years  of 
economic  recovery,  U.S.  steel  employment  was  38 percent  below  its 
1981 level,  and capacity had declined by about 14 percent. 
In March  1983 the  steel  industry  negotiated  a wage  contract  that 
46.  Crandall, The U.S.  Steel Industry, p. 103. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  77 
marked a qualitative change from previous  patterns and procedures.47 
Its principal feature was an immediate 9 percent reduction in compen- 
sation, which was to be restored over the life of the contract. 
Equally significant were numerous concessions  occurring outside the 
traditional industrywide negotiations  between  the union and the coor- 
dinating committee dominated by U.S.  Steel. Among other things, work 
rules were radically altered in local  negotiations,  while agreements  at 
individual plants or companies provided more substantial reductions in 
compensation than those included in the general contract. (In 1982 such 
agreements  were  concluded  at  McLouth  and  Wheeling-Pittsburgh.) 
Wage reductions were also associated  with changes  in ownership.  For 
example, when employees  of National Steel's  Weirton plant purchased 
that facility from the company,  they agreed to a 30 percent reduction in 
wages. 
STEEL  PRODUCTIVITY 
A corollary of the end game theory is that productivity  growth and 
wage growth are likely to be negatively  correlated.  In the first phase of 
the steel end game, productivity growth stagnated as output per manhour 
remained virtually flat between  1973 and  1980. However,  output per 
manhour in  steel  will  generally  be  sensitive  to  the  level  of  capacity 
utilization, and, as the following regression on annual data from 1960 to 
1984 indicates,  the flat productivity performance in steel after 1973 can 
be fully accounted for by lower capacity utilization levels: 
OH  3.74 +  0.015T +  0.56UT  +  0.13D74-82  +  0.21D83 +  0.36D84, 
(67.3)  (7.4)  (9.2)  (0.5)  (4.8)  (7.7) 
Standard error =  0.028  Durbin-Watson  =  1.822 
where OH is output per manhour expressed  in logarithms; T is time; UT 
is the ratio of output to capacity (see table 1);  D74-82 is a dummy variable 
equal to unity between  1974 and 1982;  D83 and D84 are dummy variables 
equal  to  unity  in  1983 and  1984,  respectively;  and  the  numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics.48 The dummy for  1974-82  is insignificant, 
indicating that the productivity slowdown  in steel can be accounted for 
47.  This account draws heavily on Barnett and Schorsch,  Steel,  pp. 70-7 1. 
48.  Corrected for first order serial correlation (Rho = 0.27). 78  Brookings Paper-s oni  Economic Activity, 1  :1985 
by adjusting  for capacity  utilization.  This suggests  that  the capacity  data 
do not fail to account  for premature  scrapping  as a result of the energy 
shocks. Steel does not support  Martin  Neil Baily's hypothesis that the 
productivity  slowdown reflects a decline in capital services due to the 
accelerated  economic  obsolescence of capital.49  Nor, in this phase, does 
it support  our corollary  hypothesis that, in the end game, unions may 
tighten  work  rules  in addition  to seeking  higher  wages. 
In the second phase of the end game, however, despite much lower 
levels of capacity utilization, output per manhour  in steel improved 
markedly.  In 1983,  with  production  about  30 percent  lower than  in 1981, 
output per manhour was  actually 5.5 percent higher. The dummy 
variables  for 1983  (D83)  and 1984  (D84)  indicate  that  output  per  manhour 
was 21 and 36 percent higher, respectively, than might have been 
expected. In part  this could be due to the closure of the most inefficient 
plants  and the growing  share  of production  accounted  for by new mini- 
mills. However, it could also reflect the relaxation  in work rules that 
accompanied  phase two of the end game in steel. 
In summary,  therefore, the steel industry is an ideal candidate  for 
testing the end game. The industry  endured  a period of over a decade 
with bleak demand  prospects but relatively  few plant closures. Union 
wage behavior reflected the opportunities that these circumstances 
provided  for obtaining  higher  wages. Many observers have suggested 
that  the high  U.S. steel wages explain  the decline in the competitiveness 
of the U.S. steel industry.  In our view, the reverse is more nearly  true: 
the decline in competitiveness  explains  the rise in steel wages. 
Testing the Slow Game: Wages in U.S. Manufacturing, 1960-84 
From the 1960s to the 1970s the United States suffered a marked 
decline  in the growth  of demand  for manufactured  goods. Output  growth 
in manufacturing  dropped 16 percent from the 1960s  to the 1970s.  The 
slump did not reflect different cyclical conditions at the end of each 
49.  Martin Neil Baily,  "Productivity and the Services  of Capital and Labor," BPEA, 
1:1981, pp. 1-50, and "The Productivity Growth Slowdown  by Industry," BPEA, 2:1982, 
pp. 423-54. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  79 
decade. Capacity utilization in manufacturing, as measured by the index 
of the Federal Reserve  Board, was 80.2 percent in 1960, 79.5 percent in 
1970, and 79.6 percent in 1980.50 Nor was it the result of a shift in the 
historic relationship between overall growth and manufacturing output. 
Rather, it was the predictable result of the decline in GNP growth itself.5' 
GNP  grew  more  slowly  because  of  a (poorly  understood)  decline  in 
productivity and because of increased cyclical  instability resulting from 
inflation and energy shocks. Manufacturing output behaved accordingly. 
How  should relative wages  respond to this medium-term decline  in 
the  growth  rate? The  slow  game  theory  suggests  that if substitution 
effects  dominate  contraction  effects  as discussed  above,  they  should 
rise in unionized industries with large amounts of specific fixed capital. 
In this section we test this conjecture with a sample of fifty-seven  U.S. 
manufacturing industries.  (The sample of industries,  which accounted 
for 85 percent of manufacturing employment in 1980, is listed in table 2.) 
Before considering the regressions,  compare the ten industries in this 
group that have the highest wage growth with the rest of the sample. As 
can be  seen  in table  3,  the ten  industries  conform  to the  slow  game 
profile. On average,  the capital-labor ratio in these  industries in  1980 
was  twice  as  high as  in the  rest  of  manufacturing; 69 percent  (19.3 
percentage points) more of the work force worked in large plants; 34.6 
percent (20.5 percentage points) more of the work force was unionized; 
and the four largest firms (measured by sales) accounted for 29.5 percent 
(11.2 percentage points) more output. With the exception of the unusually 
low proportion of female employees,  in other respects  these industries 
were  similar to  the  rest  of  manufacturing  in  their  demographic  and 
regional characteristics. 
The theory suggests that these industries will also have had relatively 
slower growth than average.  And in fact they have,  in both output and 
employment. In the 1970s, on average, their output increased 16  percent, 
compared with 27.4 percent for the typical industry in the sample; during 
the 1960s, the growth in output was 29 and 42.8 percent,  respectively. 
50.  In 1984, average capacity utilization was 81.6 percent. 
51.  Regressions  of  manufacturing  output  on  GNP  between  1960 and  1973 track 
manufacturing output, given GNP out of sample over the subsequent  decade,  extremely 
accurately. See Robert Z. Lawrence,  Can America Compete? (Brookings,  1984). ~c  oo 
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Table 3.  Profile of U.S.  Manufacturing Industries,  1960-80a 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
All manufacturingb  Ten indus- 
tries with 
largest 
Standard  wage  in- 
Item  Average  deviation  creasesc  Steel  Automobiles 
Change in average hourly 
earnings,  1970-80  76.16  8.56  89.13  103.17  84.76 
Demographic characteristics 
Black employees  (1970)  8.59  3.82  10.40  12.97  13.52 
Women employees  (1980)  30.18  16.93  15.79  6.93  14.05 
Median number of school  years 
(1970)  11.84  0.74  11.88  12.02  12.11 
Median age in years (1970)  40.02  2.03  41.21  43.67  39.28 
Employment in the South (1972)  30.09  19.12  30.87  16.54  11.47 
Employment  in the West  (1972)  11.03  7.82  12.63  6.14  5.96 
Industry characteristics 
Production workers covered 
by collective  bargaining 
(average  1968-72)  59.05  24.43  79.50  98.00  98.00 
Concentration  ratio (1977)  38.03  16.39  49.25  45.00  82.13 
Capital-labor ratio in 1980 
(in thousands  of  1972 dollars)  26.26  25.25  53.23  66.56  36.19 
Large plant percentage  (1977)  28.19  24.37  47.51  89.43  71.53 
Import share (1980)  9.51  12.30  10.05  10.79  26.18 
Export share (1980)  7.42  7.04  9.21  4.59  10.94 
Change in output,  1970-80  27.43  27.62  15.99  -  15.55  19.56 
Change in output,  1960-70  42.85  35.50  29.03  14.24  21.89 
Source:  See  appendix for data sources  and definitions. 
a.  In this table and the following,  percentage  changes  are calculated  as the difference  in logs. 
b.  In this and subsequent  tables,  "manufacturing"  refers to the sample of fifty-seven  industries listed in table 2. 
c.  For the ten industries with the highest average hourly earnings increases  during 1970-80,  see  table 2. 
Similarly,  employment  growth  in these  industries  over  the  1970s re- 
mained flat, while on average in the sample it increased by 3.1 percent.52 
REGRESSION  ANALYSIS 
To test the theory more formally we have estimated a set of regressions 
explaining industry wage levels  and changes with reduced-form specifi- 
cations. We follow much of the literature in relating wages to independent 
variables depicting industry and worker characteristics.53 Since workers 
52.  During the  1960s, average manufacturing employment  increased by  15.3 percent 
versus  only  3.9  percent  in the industries  whose  wages  increased  rapidly the following 
decade. 
53.  This approach does  not explicitly  model the structural relationships  determining 
the prices of particular characteristics. Colini  Lawvrence  and Robert Z. Laiwrence  83 
are imperfect substitutes for one another, their wages depend on their 
education,  experience,  human  capital,  and  skills.54 Since  there  are 
impediments to the mobility of workers between industries, such indus- 
try-specific characteristics as job security,  safety,  the degree of unioni- 
zation,  concentration,  regional location,  and import competition  will 
also affect wages. 
The slow game theory  suggests  the inclusion  of other categories  of 
variables.  First,  the  regressions  should  contain  empirical  proxies  to 
measure the lumpy, specific,  long-lived capital that the theory suggests 
will exercise  a crucial influence on relative wage behavior.  Since large 
plants offer significant economies  of scale in production and a "lumpy" 
production process,  the proportion of workers in large plants (those with 
more than 1,000 workers), PLP, could capture these attributes. Industry 
concentration  ratios,  CON,  could also  indicate  scale  economies.  Exit 
barriers will be  significant if capital in the  industry is long-lived  and 
industry-specific.  A valid measure of average capital life is the ratio of 
the value of fixed capital to depreciation,  KAGE. In addition, it seems 
plausible to assume that the higher the capital intensity (as measured by 
the capital-labor ratio) of production is, the less mobile (more industry- 
specific) capital is likely to be. Thus the capital-labor ratio, KL, is also a 
candidate for inclusion. 
A second group of variables is suggested by the slow game hypothesis 
that the response of wages will depend on the relative income shares of 
capital and labor and the elasticities of substitution and product demand. 
Obtaining these parameters from time series structural models for each 
industry in the sample lies beyond the scope of this study.55 Moreover, 
54.  DanielS.  Hamermesh and James H. Grant, "Econometric  Studies of Labor-Labor 
Substitution and Their Implications for Policy,"  Jolurnal of Human Resources,  vol.  14 
(Fall 1979), pp. 518-42.  Hamermesh  and Grant have reviewed  sixteen  studies of labor- 
labor substitution,  all of which  specify  that different categories  of workers,  grouped by 
sex,  race,  education,  age,  or  production/nonproduction,  are  imperfect  substitutes  in 
aggregate production functions. 
55.  Freeman and Medoff  have  demonstrated  that substitution  between  production 
labor and other  inputs  is  generally  lower  in union  than  nonunion  settings.  Thus  the 
proportion of unionization variable itself may be a useful proxy for the initial (long-run) 
elasticity  of  the demand for union labor.  Richard B.  Freeman  and James  L.  Medoff, 
"Substitution Between Production Labor and Other Inputs in Unionized and Nonunionized 
Manufacturing," Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 64 (May 1982), pp. 220-33. See 
also  Freeman and Medoff,  "The  Impact  of  the  Percentage  Organized  on  Union  and 
Nonunion Wages,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  63 (November  1981), pp. 
561-72. 84  Br-ookings  Papers on0  Economic Activity,  1:1985 
in general, as we have shown above,  nonlinear combinations  of these 
variables will determine the response. 
If, on the other hand, Leontief  production functions  were assumed 
ex post,  as demonstrated above,  the rise in wages  would be related to 
average quasi-rents (profits) per worker. The target for workers' scoop- 
ing would be r(K/L). Thus average profits per worker previous to slow 
game could be used in the regressions. In addition, provided the elasticity 
of demand is greater than the elasticity of substitution, as we have shown 
above, there should be a positive relationship between the income share 
of capital evaluated at the long-run equilibrium (that is, prior to the slow 
game) and the subsequent  rise in wages  during slow game.  Third, the 
exogenous  shocks that induce slow game should be modeled explicitly. 
Conceptually  these  could be either general (economywide)  or sector- 
specific  shocks.  In a cross-sectional  analysis  taken at a point in time, 
however,  the  economywide  shocks  are by  definition identical  for all 
industries, and thus they cannot be entered explicitly  in the regression. 
By estimating cross-sectional  regressions at different times during which 
different  economywide  conditions  prevailed,  however,  we  hope  to 
discern  the  impact of  such  disturbances.  We  model  industry-specific 
shocks  by inserting a variable that multiplies industry growth over the 
previous decade by the capital-labor ratio. 
As will be evident,  our regressions  entail several compromises  nec- 
essary  for empirical work.  Nonetheless,  as we  shall show,  they  offer 
considerable support for the relevance of the slow game theory. 
VARIABLES 
The  variables  used  in  the  regressions  and  the  coefficients  to  be 
expected  include: 
Slow Game Variables 
-KL  (fixed  capital  per  employee)  should  not  have  a  significant 
coefficient  under competitive  conditions;  however,  in the slow game it 
would be positively  associated  with wages. 
-KAGE  (ratio of value of fixed capital to depreciation) should not be 
significant in conventional theory; in slow game it should have a positive 
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-KL*DO  (interaction of the capital-labor ratio and industry growth 
over  the previous  decade)  should have  a negative  coefficient  in slow 
game, when slow demand growth will be associated  in capital-intensive 
industries with high wages. 
-r(K/L)  (profits per worker) could be positively associated with wage 
increases in end game. 
-SK  (the initial share of capital in value-added) should have a positive 
coefficient in slow game, provided that the elasticity of demand is greater 
than the elasticity of substitution. Under normal circumstances  it should 
not be significant. 
Conventional  Variables Related to Slow Game 
-UN  (proportion of union members) has a positive coefficient, which 
should increase in slow game. 
-PLP  (proportion of workers in plants with more than 1,000 workers) 
is expected  to  have  a positive  coefficient  to  the degree  that working 
conditions in such plants are unpleasant enough to facilitate unionization 
(and thus nonunion employers keep wages high to discourage unioniza- 
tion)  or  union  militancy.56 In the  slow  game,  the  coefficient  should 
increase. 
-CON  (concentration ratio, or proportion of total output accounted 
for by the four largest firms) could be positive  if concentration  implies 
higher profits,  some  of  which  are  reflected  in wages,  or  negative  if 
oligopsonistic  firms can drive down wages."7 To the degree that CON 
reflects  exit  barriers  and  scale  economies  (that  is,  lumpiness),  the 
coefficient should become positive in slow game. 
56.  See  John  E.  Kwoka,  "Monopoly  Plant  and  Union  Wage  Effects  on  Worker 
Wages,"  Indiustrial and  Labor Relations  Review,  vol.  36 (January  1983), pp.  251-57; 
Stanley  Masters,  "An  Interindustry  Analysis  of  Wages  and  Plant  Size,"  Review  of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 51 (August 1969), pp. 341-45; and F. M. Scherer, "Industrial 
Structure, Scale  Economies,  and Worker Alienation,"  in Robert Masson  and P. David 
Qualls, eds.,  Essays on Industrial Organization in Honor of Joe S. Bain (Ballinger, 1976), 
pp. 105-21. 
57.  See  Kwoka,  'Monopoly  Plant,"  for a survey  of  the  studies  on  the  impact  of 
concentration on wages. See also Thomas A. Pugel, "Profitability, Concentration and the 
Interindustry Variation in Wages,"  ReOvie"  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  62 (May 
1980), pp.  248-53;  Salinger,  "Tobin's  q,  Unionization,  and the  Concentration-Profits 
Relationship"; and Leonard W. Weiss,  "Concentration and Labor Earnings," Ameerican 
Economic Review, vol. 56 (March 1966), pp. 96-117. cS7  r  X  o  o  00  00  o  o~~~~~~~~~~~~7  00  00 
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Conventional Variables 
-FE  (the proportion of women) is expected to exert a negative impact 
on wages because of discrimination and female labor force participation 
characteristics. 
-ED  (the median  number of  school  years)  is  expected  to  have  a 
positive sign because of returns to general human capital. 
-BL  (proportion of blacks) could have a negative coefficient reflecting 
employment discrimination. 
-AGE  (median age) has a positive  coefficient  indicating returns to 
experience. 
-IM  (ratio of value of imports to domestic production) has a negative 
coefficient  to the degree that international competition  exerts  a down- 
ward influence on wages. 
-EN  (ratio of consumption  of energy to output in 1972 dollars) has, 
in theory,  no  necessary  relationship  to  wages;  however,  it may  be 
associated  with higher wages  in a period of energy  shocks  (assuming 
that energy and capital are complements). 
-SO  (proportion  of  employment  located  in  the  South)  could  be 
negative to reflect lower costs of living. 
COLA Variable 
-COL  (proportion of workers  covered  by COLAs)  should have  a 
positive  coefficient  if, as the institutionalist  interpretation would have 
it, COLAs contributed to high relative wages in the 1970s. 
A detailed description of the variables and their sources  is provided 
in the appendix. 
EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS 
Consider the regressions reported in table 4 explaining (the logarithms 
of) average hourly earnings in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984.58  Overall the 
58.  In regressions explaining the logarithm of average hourly earnings, CON, BL, EN, 
and SK were generally not found to be significant. While KAGE, EN,  and r(K/L) were 
significant and behaved according to the slow game hypothesis,  the significance of these 
variables was removed when KL was introduced into the regressions. They have therefore 
been dropped from the regressions reported in table 4. The role of COL will be examined 
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regressions  perform satisfactorily,  accounting  for between  87 and 93 
percent of the overall variance, with standard errors ranging from 6 to 7 
percent.  The  coefficients  have  reasonable  orders  of  magnitude  that 
accord  with  those  in other  studies.  Consider  equation  1, explaining 
average hourly earnings in 1984, for example. It suggests that, everything 
else  being equal, female  earnings were  60 percent  of male earnings.59 
Each  one-year  increase  in  the  median  schooling  of  the  labor  force 
increased  wages  by  10 percent.60 Each  additional year of median age 
(experience)  raised wages  by  1 percent.  Labor in the South was about 
15 percent cheaper than elsewhere  in the United States.  Each 1 percent 
increase in the proportion of workers in large plants raised wages by 0.28 
percent.61  Each 1 percent increase in the capital-labor ratio raised wages 
by  0.11  percent.  Each  1 percentage  point  increase  in  the  share  of 
unionized labor raised wages by 8 percent.62  Finally, a 1 percent increase 
in the share of imports lowered wages by 0.18 percent.63 
A comparison  of the coefficients  over  the twenty-four-year  period 
indicates  that they  support the expectations  of the slow  game theory. 
Recall  that,  as  measured  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  capacity 
utilization in each of the sample years (1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984) was 
similar. Thus cyclical  effects  are unlikely to account for differences  in 
the  coefficients.  In  the  1960 and  1970 regressions,  KL  has  a  small 
59.  In the 1969 census  data, annual mean female earnings were 55.7 percent of male 
earnings for full-time earners who worked 50-52 weeks.  In 1979, similar female earnings 
were 52 percent of those of males. 
60.  This accords quite closely with the results in C. T. Haworth and D. W. Rasmussen, 
"Human Capital and Inter-Industry Wages in Manufacturing," Reiview of Economics  and 
Statistics,  vol. 53 (November  1971), pp. 376-80. 
61.  See Kwoka,  "Monopoly  Plant,"  and Masters,  "An Interindustry Analysis,"  for 
studies of this effect. 
62.  For a comprehensive  review  of  the evidence  of  the effect  of unions,  see  C. J. 
Parsly, "Labor Union Effects  on Wage Gains: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol.  18 (March 1980), pp. 1-31. 
63.  See  Stephen  A.  Rhoades,  "Wages,  Concentration,  and Import Penetration: An 
Analysis  of the Interrelationships,"  Atlantic Econonmic  Journal,  vol.  12 (July 1984), pp. 
23-31. Rhoades found strong support for the hypothesis that imports reduce profit margins. 
See  also  Howard  P.  Marvel,  "Foreign  Trade and Domestic  Competition,"  Economic 
Inqluiry, vol.  18 (January 1980), pp. 103-22; Thomas A. Pugel,  "Foreign Trade and U.S. 
Market Performance,"  Jouirnal of Industrial Economics,  vol.  29 (December  1980), pp. 
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coefficient and, in accord with the agnosticism  of conventional  theory, 
is not statistically significant. Under usual circumstances  unions do not 
capture normal rates of return. On the other hand, in the slow game, 
incentives  may change.  Between  1970 and 1980 the coefficient  on KL 
became highly significant, as our theory would predict. In addition, the 
coefficients on unionization and the large plant variables doubled in size 
and increased  in significance.  To capture industry-specific  slow  game 
effects,  the interactive variable, the product of output growth over the 
previous decade and the capital-labor ratio (KL*DO), has been entered 
in regressions  9 and 10. Both verge on statistical  significance and have 
the negative coefficient that the slow game theory would predict. 
OTHER  VARIABLES 
Between  1960 and 1970, the growing internationalization of the U.S. 
economy  increased the importance of imports as a source of downward 
pressure on wages. Any given import share in 1970 had a greater negative 
impact on wages  in 1970 than it did in 1960. Note  the much larger (in 
absolute magnitude) and more significant coefficient  on IM in equation 
3 for 1970 than in equation 4 for 1960. This change could occur if imports 
and domestic products became closer substitutes over time. 
During the  1960s demographic factors  exerted  fairly constant  influ- 
ences (note how similar the other coefficients  in equation 3 are to those 
in equation 4).  During the  1970s, however,  the dramatic shifts in the 
composition  of  the  U.S.  labor  force  affected  relative  wages  quite 
considerably.  The large influx of educated,  female,  and young workers 
depressed the earnings of such workers. Compare equations estimated 
for  1970 and  1980,  and  note  the  decline  in  the  coefficients  on  the 
proportion of women and median years of schooling and the increase in 
the significance  of  the  variable measuring  median age.  These  results 
accord  with  other  research  findings.  Richard B.  Freeman  and  Finis 
Welch have concluded that the size of the baby-boom cohort has reduced 
the relative earnings of younger workers.M4  James H. Grant and Daniel 
64.  Richard B. Freeman,  "The Decline  in the Economic  Rewards to College  Educa- 
tion,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  59 (February  1977), pp.  18-29;  Finis 
Welch, "Effects  of Cohort Size on Earnings: The Baby Boom Babies'  Financial Bust," 
Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 87 (October 1979), pp. S65-97. 90  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
S. Hamermesh have found that increases  in female labor force partici- 
pation have reduced the relative earnings of women and young men.65 
Apparently  some  of  the  declines  in the  relative  wages  of  certain 
demographic groups over the decade of the 1970s are not permanent and 
reflect only the transitory requirements of absorbing those groups into 
the labor force. Between  1980  and 1984  the coefficients on age, schooling, 
and the proportion of females all returned to their 1960 and 1970 levels. 
On the other hand, while the premium paid to older workers declined 
somewhat, it remained higher than in the earlier decades.  The coefficient 
on unionization  declined,  but, as of  1984, capital-labor ratios and the 
proportion of workers  in large plants affected  wages  even  more than 
they had in 1960 or 1970. 
AUTOS  AND  STEEL 
Equations 5 through 8 report the previous formulation but with steel 
and automobile wages indicated by dummy variables.66  Considering how 
frequently  the behavior  of auto wages  is alleged  to be  idiosyncratic, 
these  results are quite surprising. The coefficients  on the independent 
variables are generally not greatly affected by dropping steel and autos 
from the sample.  In none of the years are mean wages in autos signifi- 
cantly  different  from  those  forecast  by  the  equation.  The  error  in 
forecasting  automobile  wages  increased  from 2 to 5 percent  between 
1960 and 1970, remained at 5 percent in 1980, and was only 3 percent in 
1984. Steel wages, on the other hand, were more volatile relative to their 
forecast  levels,  shifting from a positive  error of 4 percent  in 1960 to a 
negative error of 5 percent in 1970, a positive  error of 3 percent in 1980, 
and a statistically  significant negative  error of  15 percent in 1984. The 
errors in the forecasts for steel wages suggest that a special interpretation 
of industry wage behavior is warranted; the automobile wage behavior, 
65.  James H. Grant and Daniel S. Hamermesh,  "Labor Market Competition among 
Youth, White Women and Others," Reviewi of Economics  antd  Statistics,  vol. 63 (August 
1981), pp. 354-60.  See  also David C. Stapleton  and Douglas  J. Young,  "The Effects  of 
Demographic  Change  on  the  Distribution  of  Wages,  1967-1990,"  Jour/nial  of  Hiumiialn 
Resources,  vol. 19  (Spring 1984), pp. 175-201; Lucy B. Mallan, "Labor Force Participation, 
Work Experience,  and the  Pay  Gap Between  Men  and Women,"  Jolurnal of  Hulman 
Resouirces, vol.  17 (Summer 1982), pp. 437-48. 
66.  This procedure is equivalent to dropping observations  for these variables from the 
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on the other  hand,  indicates  that  automobile  wages are driven  by forces 
similar  to those that  affect wages elsewhere in U.S. manufacturing. 
CHANGE  EQUATIONS 
Despite their satisfactory  performance,  the formulations  reported  in 
table  4 may have some deficiencies. Several variables  may be biased as 
a result of simultaneity.  While a high share of imports could depress 
domestic  wages, high domestic wages could raise imports.  Similarly,  a 
high capital-labor  ratio could raise wages (because of its effect on the 
marginal  product  of labor),  but high  wages could induce  the use of more 
capital-intensive  techniques. 
In addition, the levels specification fails to test explicitly for the 
statistical  significance  of the shifts in the coefficients  over time. Both of 
these defects are remedied in table 5, where changes over particular 
periods  are  regressed  against  independent  variables  measured  eitherjust 
prior  to or in the initial  year of the observation  period. This procedure 
should reduce the problem of simultaneity  bias. Thus, for example, 
while high  wages in 1970  may induce  a large  increase  in imports  in 1970, 
there is less reason to expect that a large  wage change over the decade 
of the 1970s  would be associated with a large import share in 1970.67 
Note that  in  an  equation  on the  first  differences  in  the dependent  variable, 
the coefficients on the level variables  provide estimates of changes in 
the coefficients  .68 
A set of equations  explaining  first  differences  in average  hourly  pay 
is provided  in table 5.69  The results in these regressions  are similar  to 
67.  This assumes  that imports in  1970 were unlikely to be affected  by expectations 
about relative wages for periods as long as a decade in advance. 
68.  Assume the specification  LnW = aC,. Taking derivatives  of both sides: dLnWi = 
adCi +  daCi. Thus in an equation in which wages are expressed  as first differences in the 
logs, coefficients on changes in the variable provide estimates  of the original level effect 
(that is, a), whereas the coefficient on the level is an estimate of the change in the coefficient. 
69.  If variables for changes in PLP, IM, and KL are included in this specification, they 
do not affect coefficients  on the remaining variables.  The exception  is the change in FE 
(DFE) between  1970 and 1980, which is significantly (negatively)  correlated with FE in 
1970. Including DFE  in the regression  makes  the coefficient  on FE more negative  and 
statistically significant. It does not, however,  affect the remaining coefficients.  Again we 
do not report our estimates  using several of the end game proxies  discussed  above.  We 
obtain positive and significant results with r(K/L), EN, and KAGE. However,  in each case, c  )C  00  e  n  )  00  'e 
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those  in table 4. Very few  of the variables help explain wage changes 
between  1960 and  1970. In equation  1, only  the  coefficient  of FE  is 
significant. There is also some indication of statistically important effects 
for  imports  and capital-labor  ratios.  Despite  the  low  R-squared,  the 
equation has a relatively  small standard error, indicating that over the 
1960s there was little variation in relative wages.  In the  1970s, on the 
other hand, the variables as specified  in equation 2 in table 5 afford a 
powerful explanation for wage changes over the decade.  They account 
for 73 percent of the overall variance, with a standard error of 4.8 percent. 
Statistically significant changes are indicated for the effects of schooling, 
imports, unionization,  the capital-labor ratio, and large plants. In addi- 
tion, if SK for 1970 is added to this equation (not reported), the R-squared 
increases  to 0.75 and the coefficient  on SK is positive  with a t-ratio of 
1.8-again,  evidence  supporting  the  slow  game  scenario  under  the 
assumption that the elasticity of demand is greater than the elasticity of 
substitution  .70 
Reversals in the impact of education, the proportion of union workers, 
and the  proportion  of  workers  in  the  South  from  1980 to  1984 are 
indicated in equation 4. Thus between  1970 and 1984 (equation 3) the 
significant changes  in the coefficients  are confined to the variables for 
the capital-labor ratio and large plants. There is also some indication of 
an increased effect for age. The slow game variables provide most of the 
explanation. 
The remaining four equations  introduce dummy variables for auto- 
mobiles  and  steel  into  the  equation.  The  equation  accounts  for  the 
increase  in relative  average  hourly  wages  in automobiles  of  about  8 
percent during the 1970s and 10 percent between  1970 and 1984. On the 
other hand, the rise in steel  wages  between  1970 and  1980 is some  6 
percent larger than can be explained-supporting  the suggestion in our 
case study above that specific end game variables were at work. 
Equation 8 indicates an unusual decline (an error of  -  18 percent) in 
relative steel wages between  1980 and 1984. 
when  KL  is  introduced  into  the  regressions,  these  variables  lose  their  significance. 
Multicollinearity is a problem in trying to obtain joint estimates  with these variables. The 
correlation between  KAGE and KL using 1980 data was 0.64.  This suggests  that capital 
intensity, asjudged by the capital-labor ratio, and long-lived capital are typically associated. 
70.  If SK is substituted for KL in the equation explaining the change in hourly earnings 
from 1970 to 1980, it has a t-ratio of 4.1 and a coefficient of 0.27, and the overall equation 
has a standard error of 0.053. 00  00  00  00  0  m  -  N  o 
. 
. 
C4  I-  "I  t  o  o  tr)  tr  tr  V)  V 
w~~~~~~~~~~~, 
C)  C)  00  "I  "I 
m  m  m  m 
z 
0  0n  0  0  0  0  0  !  U k oo  e  ?  N  N  N  N  N  N  00o 
ce)  ~  ~ c  kr)  kr)~00 
-  .6.6.i.-o-o  .  . 
o  ON  O  :NO 
l  -~~  oe1  .  o- 
O  Y>  US  X  00  00>m>00  00  0  1  *  -  o-oc 
zi~  ~  ~~~  ~ 
o  S  *  o  *  O  C 
L  0  00  04 
W~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  *  .>!  00  C) *-  *  *  00  00  C) ** 
.  0N  OO 
_I  SI 
-  .  U  X  (  NO**N  00  ?ir  *  .|. 
X 
O  X  ~~~~~~~~~~to  to  _Xc 
x  nCQ 
v0. 
CU-'  N  ob  t  t  )  xD  00  ON  0  N  r  c Colin Lawrence and Rober t Z. Lawrence  95 
How much  of the overall  variance  in wage growth  is accounted  for by 
the slow game variables (PLP and KL), and how much by the more 
conventional  demographic  factors? A rough answer can be gauged  by 
examining  the regressions reported  in table 6. The complete equation 
(equation  2 in table 5), reproduced  as equation 1 in table 6, explains 73 
percent  of the variance.  Equation  2, with  just KL and  PLP, accounts  for 
49 percent  of the variance.  The addition  of UN raises the R-squared  to 
0.61. On  the other  hand,  equation  6, with  just the demographic  variables 
(FE, ED, AGE, and SO),  accounts for 40 percent. This confirms  the 
importance  of both  the slow game  and  the demographic  explanations  for 
relative wage dispersion during  the 1970s. Demographic  variables  be- 
come much  less important,  however,  when  the  period  1980-84  is included 
in the sample. Over the fourteen-year  period 1970-84 (equation  8), the 
variance  explained  by just KL and PLP of 0.52 is virtually  the same as 
the 0.58 in the complete specification.  It is remarkable  that a regression 
with  just these two variables  can track average hourly earnings  in the 
U.S. automobile  industry  between 1970  and 1984  with an error  of just 1 
percent. 
In 1980  average hourly wages in the automobile  industry  were 32.8 
percent  (in  the  logs)  higher  than  hourly  wages  in  the  rest  of manufacturing. 
Equations  2 in table 4 and 2 in table 5 have been used to quantify  the 
contributions  of each independent  variable.  As reported  in table  7, about 
7.4 percentage points are due to the relatively low employment of 
females, 3.5 to the low share of production  in the South, and 1.7 to the 
higher median education of employees. Import pressures kept wages 
3.54 percent  lower than  they would  otherwise  have been. About  half  the 
differential  is explained by PLP and KL. The change in auto wages 
between 1970  and 1980,  however, is better accounted  for by the extent 
of unionization,  the capital-labor  ratio, and large plants. In the case of 
steel wages (equations  1  and  2 in table  7), of all  the demographic  variables 
only  the  relatively  high  average  age  of the  work  force  exerted  a substantial 
impact  in the rapid  wage rise during  the 1970s. The remaining  changes 
are  ascribed  to the high  KL and  PLP values. 
COMPENSATION 
The wage variable  we have examined thus far is for average hourly 
earnings.  While  the changes  in  this  indicator  of wages  correspond  closely V-r 
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with those in total compensation overall (with a correlation  of 0.88) 
during the 1970s, the increase in relative total compensation in the 
automobile  industry  (14 percent)  was larger  (and  more relevant  to labor 
costs in  the  industry)  than  the increase  in  relative  average  hourly  earnings 
(8 percent).  Accordingly  in table 8 we have reestimated  the regressions 
using changes in average compensation  and levels of compensation  as 
the dependent variables. The changes in the coefficients on the level 
equations  1 and 2 indicate  shifts in the discount  on female wages and an 
increase  in the return  to age. However, they do not indicate  declines in 
the return  to schooling  or in the impact  of the South, as in the hourly  pay 
regressions. UN fails to have a significant  effect in these regressions, 
and  its role  is taken  over by the CON  variable.  However, the same  major 
rise in the coefficients  on KL and  PLP is evident in these results. 
It is noteworthy  that the regression  explains  out of sample  the rise in 
relative  compensation  in automobile  wages with an error  of just 1 per- 
cent, and the level of auto compensation  in 1980  with an error  of just 3 
percent. The error in tracking  steel compensation  over the decade is 
again  considerably  larger-7 percent. 
OTHER  TESTS 
It is of interest to test the additional  power of the explanation  that 
accounts  for wage shifts in the 1970s  in terms  of COLA-plus  contracts. 
A second data set includes variables at the two-digit SIC level. 
Reducing  the number  of industries  by going to this high level of aggre- 
gation severely reduces degrees of freedom but allows testing for the 
role of COLAs. These regressions  (not reported)  gave similar  results  to 
those above. Seventy-eight  percent of the variance of average hourly 
wage  growth  over the 1970s  can be explained  by four  variables:  FE, ED, 
KL,  and  CON.  The COL  variable  was not significant.7'  This  specification 
has an error  of 5.8 in primary  metals compensation  and almost  no error 
in the changes  in automobile  compensation. 
71.  Freeman and Medoff note, "According to our estimates,  in manufacturing, COLA 
provisions contributed only a modest amount to the rising union advantage: union workers 
without COLA clauses did nearly as well as union workers with such clauses."  What Do 
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INTERACTION  EFFECTS 
Our theory  anticipates  that unionized  and nonunionized  industries 
will  react  differently  in  the  slow  game.  But  our efforts  at  inserting 
multiplicative variables, for example,  UN*PLP,  UN*KL, and UN*IM, 
failed to provide robust results,  in part because  of the high multicollin- 
earity between these multiplicative variables and their components.  This 
finding could  indicate  that  emulation  effects  are  important  in union 
behavior so that even in cases where unions do not have high membership 
proportions, industries behave  "as if they were unionized,"  in order to 
ward off the threat of unions.72 Emulation tends to be greatest with large 
firms. Indeed  Freeman  and Medoff  report that the  union  differential 
varies inversely  with plant size.73 But it is likely that the weak perfor- 
mance of the union variable is due to the fact that most of the industries 
in  the  sample  are  highly  unionized.  Thirty-eight  of  the  fifty-seven 
industries in the sample are more than 50 percent unionized,  and only 
nine have less than 40 percent of their production workers in unions. 
In  summary,  compared  with  preceding  decades,  the  1970s was  a 
period of slower overall growth, much lower capacity expansion of large 
structures, growing import penetration in heavy  industries,  increasing 
regulations restricting investment in high-pollution sectors, and substan- 
tial energy shocks.  All of these  developments  reduced demand for the 
products of heavy industry and, as we have shown, provided reasons to 
expect an increase in union wage demands in heavy industry. 
In response to the slow game, wage increases were, in fact, particularly 
rapid in industries with high capital-labor ratios and large plants. The 
phenomenon was pervasive,  with the automobile industry behaving in a 
typical and predictable fashion given wage behavior elsewhere  in man- 
ufacturing. 
On the  other  hand,  while  some  of  the  rise  in  steel  wages  can  be 
accounted for in the cross-section  estimates,  large residuals remain. In 
particular, the recent declines in steel wages are extremely unusual. The 
regressions support the view that by 1984, the steel industry had entered 
the end of the end game. 
72.  For support of this view,  see Freeman and Medoff,  What Do  Unions Do?,  chap. 
10. See also S. Rosen,  "Trade Union Power, Threat Effects  and the Extent of Organiza- 
tion," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 36 (April 1969), pp. 185-96. 
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Productivity Declines 
Wage  increases  are  often  regarded  as a  reward  for  greater  productivity. 
Yet in our  sample  of fifty-seven  manufacturing  industries,  those with the 
fastest wage  growth  in the 1970s  were also those with the slowest growth 
in productivity  and the greatest  productivity  declines. Over the 1970s, 
for example, there was a negative correlation (-0.245)  between the 
growth in value added per employee and average hourly pay in the 
sample. 
Changes  in output  per employee reflect  both the impact  of changes  in 
the capital-labor  ratio and disembodied  technical  progress.  The contri- 
bution  of changes  in  capital  per  employee  can  be estimated  by multiplying 
the share of capital by changes in the capital-labor  ratio. The residual 
productivity  growth  can then be estimated  by subtracting  the contribu- 
tion of increases in the capital-labor  ratio  from  the overall  rise in output 
per  employee. Using data  on the 1970  share  of capital  in value added  and 
the change in the capital-labor  ratio between 1970  and 1980, we have 
estimated  residual  productivity  growth  for each of the fifty-seven  indus- 
tries in our sample. The correlation between the growth in average 
hourly wages between 1970 and 1980 and the residual productivity 
variable  is -0.35.74 
Our  finding  has been corroborated.  In his study of the productivity 
slowdown across U.S. industries,  Baily adjusted  the growth in output 
per manhour  for both changes in the capital-labor  ratio and changes in 
capacity  utilization.75  Baily estimated  the (adjusted)  productivity  slow- 
down in twenty-one two-digit  manufacturing  industries  by subtracting 
the annual  (adjusted)  average  growth  in productivity  between 1953  and 
1973  from the annual  (adjusted)  average productivity  growth between 
1973 and 1980. The correlation between Baily's growth slowdown 
measures and average hourly earnings increases in these twenty-one 
industries  over the 1970s  is - 0.52.76  The industries  with  the largest  wage 
increases had  the largest  slowdowns  in productivity  growth. 
How can this behavior  be explained?  In our discussion of the slow 
74.  Changes greater than 0.265 are significant at the 5 percent level. 
75.  See Baily,  "The Productivity Growth Slowdown,"  pp. 423-59. 
76.  The data for the productivity slowdown  are to be found in column 3 in table 2 of 
Baily,  "The Productivity Growth Slowdown,"  p. 437. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  101 
game we suggested  that unions may use their increased  power in slow 
game to demand  more than  just higher wages. In particular,  in cases 
where working  conditions are associated with considerable  disutility, 
work  rules  may  be altered  if  the  demand  for  labor  becomes  less responsive 
to its wage, including  the "shadow" wage costs of such rules. If the 
union hand is strengthened  by a decline in the demand elasticity for 
union labor, featherbedding  may also be increased to preserve union 
jobs. A corollary  of rising  relative  wages, therefore,  could  be an unusual 
decline  in productivity  growth. 
In his study, Baily  reports  a strong  association  between  the slowdown 
in adjusted  productivity  growth and capital intensity (as measured  by 
the nonlabor  share  of income).77  His explanation  focuses on the prema- 
ture retirement  of obsolete capital. However, if capital were to be 
speedily retired  and plants were driven by the energy shocks close to 
shutdown,  one would not expect relatively  rapid  increases  in wages. On 
the other  hand,  if new investment  were expected  to be lower  and  devoted 
to saving  energy  rather  than  labor,  unions  might  react  by demanding  and 
receiving  higher  relative  wages and  more  attractive  work  rules. Thus  the 
slow game may be the link between the anomalous  behavior  of produc- 
tivity and wage growth. It provides another  theoretical  explanation  for 
the association  found by Baily between the productivity  slowdown and 
capital  intensity. 
Applications, Implications, and Conclusions 
During the late  1960s and early 1970s, real wages in European 
manufacturing  increased  more  rapidly  than  was warranted  by productiv- 
ity growth and terms-of-trade  changes.78  While there is a legitimate 
debate about whether real wages in Europe are still above levels 
warranted  for  full  employment,  the persistence  of these levels in a period 
of slow overall  growth  and  rising  unemployment  has not  been adequately 
explained. 
The conventional  account  of this behavior  is analogous  to that in the 
United  States  for wages in steel and  automobiles:  workers  became  used 
77.  Ibid. 
78.  See, for example, Jeffrey D. Sachs,  "Wages,  Profits, and Macroeconomic  Adjust- 
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to a certain increase in real wages and demanded that increase regardless 
of economic circumstances.  But this account of European wage behavior 
is as unsatisfactory as it is for U. S. autos and steel. Workers presumably 
seek  the highest  wages  they can get at all times.  If they  were able to 
obtain higher income  shares in the early  1970s, when warranted wage 
growth declined,  why were they not able to obtain them earlier? At a 
first reading, the facts of the European situation conform to slow game. 
Capacity-expanding investment in European manufacturing slowed ap- 
preciably after 1973. The high levels of capacity utilization now prevailing 
in Europe are associated  with increased  unemployment  levels.  More- 
over,  the implementation in the early  1970s of various pieces  of social 
legislation  conferring virtual tenure on employees  corresponds  at the 
macroeconomic  level  to  featherbedding  at  the  industry  level.79 An 
extension  of the slow game interpretation to an economywide  or sector- 
wide application appears a worthwhile topic for further research. 
An examination of relative union wages in other periods also warrants 
investigation.  As  estimated  by George  Johnson,  there was  a massive 
rise in the union wage differential in the  1930s-a  period in which end 
game developments  would have also been relevant.80 
Our results  have  implications  for  other  empirical  work.  We  have 
shown in our theoretical analysis how high wages can be associated with 
both  very  high and very  low  levels  of profitability (or of Tobin's  q). 
Empirical estimates  of the link between  unionization  and profitability 
need to take account of the nonlinear relationship likely to be found. We 
have found several shifts in the impact of demographic variables between 
1980 and 1984. New  (and more extensive)  investigations  of the returns 
to schooling in recent data appear warranted. 
The  work  of  Gene  M.  Grossman  in  estimating  the  link  between 
imports  and  domestic  employment  is  a  considerable  advance  over 
conventional  input-output estimates.  However,  as the end game theory 
shows,  in capital-intensive  industries,  changes  in competitiveness  and 
wages  may  be  associated  negatively  rather than  positively,  as  such 
modeling assumes.8' 
79.  See Bela Balassa, "The Economic Consequences  of Social Policies in the Industrial 
Countries,"  Welwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol.  120, no. 2 (1984), pp. 213-27. 
80.  Cited in Freeman and Medoff,  What Do  Unions Do?,  p. 53. 
81.  See Gene M. Grossman, "Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S.  Steel 
Industry,"  Discussion  Paper  78  (Princeton  University,  September  1978), and  "The 
Employment  and Wage Effects  of Import Competition  in the United  States,"  Working 
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Our analysis  also  has  two  policy  implications.  First,  if  workers 
perceive that their industry is in decline,  they may well seek wages that 
make decline  certain. The governrnent should therefore ensure that it 
avoids taking actions that could exacerbate  these effects.  In particular, 
providing trade protection in the form of quotas will lower the derived 
demand elasticity,  thereby encouraging unions to demand even  higher 
wages.  Second, in end game, subsidies for declining industries are likely 
to flow directly from the government to labor without materially affecting 
the revitalization of the industry. Indeed, the end game theory indicates 
why wages  are particularly likely to rise in public sector  services  with 
large amounts  of  capital  (for example,  railroads and subways)  when 
growth prospects  appear limited. The government  should not enhance 
wage disparities by policies  that strengthen workers' incentives  to seek 
higher wages and thus increase the difficulties of adjustment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Existing explanations for the relative wage changes in U.S.  manufac- 
turing over the past fifteen years are unsatisfactory.  In principle,  it is 
inappropriate to account for pervasive secular relative wage movements 
in terms of short-run inflation, business-cycle  fluctuations,  or industry- 
specific institutional arrangements. In practice, the alleged link between 
COLAs and increases in relative wages is not supported by the data. 
The end game and slow  game theories  advanced  here build a more 
satisfactory theoretical explanation and have strong explanatory power. 
Most popular discussions  of relative wage behavior in the steel industry 
suggest that the wage determination process  reflects an irrational lem- 
ming-like desire for extinction  on the part of the participants. We have 
demonstrated, to the contrary, that high relative wages may be the result 
of declining competitiveness  rather than the cause. The end game model 
forecasts a two-phase response to a sequence of demand declines.  In the 
first, relative  wages  rise  as  unions  harvest  the  quasi-rents  that once 
accrued to capital. In the second,  relative wages fall in response  to the 
credible threat of permanent plant closings.  Steel  wage behavior con- 
forms to this forecast: the first phase lasted from about 1970 to 1982; the 
second from 1982 to the present. 
We have explained why relative wages  in heavy  industry could rise 
in  response  to  a  medium-term  decline  in  growth  prospects.  In  our 
empirical work,  we  have  demonstrated  that  much  of  the  increased 104  Brookings Papers on Econiomic Activity, 1:1985 
dispersion in U.S.  manufacturing wages can be explained by the increas- 
ing importance of capital intensity and plant size in raising relative wages. 
Popular discussion  also  suggests  that compensation  patterns in the 
U.S.  automobile  industry  have  been  unusual  and idiosyncratic.  Our 
regression  analysis  indicates  that in fact  the determinants  of relative 
automobile wages are the same as those elsewhere  in the manufacturing 
sector. 
If  slow  game  was  the  source  of  the  increased  dispersion  in U.S. 
manufacturing wages  over  the past  decade,  the recent  restoration  of 
medium-term prospects  for growth should reverse  these  relative wage 
patterns. There is some preliminary evidence  that supports this predic- 
tion. Between  1982 and 1984, wages in unionized industries increased 2 
percent  less  rapidly than those  in the rest of manufacturing. And the 
dispersion in average hourly wages across manufacturing was no greater 
in 1984 than in 1982. Perhaps the fast game has begun. 
APPENDIX 
Variables and Data  Sources 
AGE  Median age of employees  in 1970, defined as the weighted sum of 
males and females.  From U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Census of 
Population:  1970, Subject Reports,  Industrial  Characteristics, 
Final Report PC(2)-7B (GPO, 1973). 
BL  Proportion of black employees  in industry in 1970, defined as the 
weighted  sum of males and females.  From U.S.  Bureau of the 
Census,  Census ofPopulation:  1970, Subject Reports, Industrial 
Characteristics,  Final Report PC(2)-7B (GPO, 1973). 
CON  Concentration ratio, defined as the share of value of shipments 
accounted for by the four largest companies in each manufactur- 
ing industry. From U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  1977 Census of 
Manufactures,  Subject Statistics,  vol. I (GPO, 1981). 
DQ  Percentage change in real output (1972 dollars) for 1960-70 and 
1970-80.  From U.S.  Bureau of Economic Analysis,  input-output 
tape. Colini  Lawvrence  and Robert Z. Lawvrence  105 
ED  Median school  years  completed  by employees,  defined as the 
weighted  sum of years attained by males  and females  in  1970. 
From U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Census of Population:  1970, 
Subject Reports, Industrial Characteristics,  Final Report PC(2)- 
7B (GPO, 1973). 
FE  Proportion of women  in industry.  From U.S.  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various issues. 
IM  Proportion of imports in industry, defined as ratio of imports to 
output  (all in  1972 dollars).  From  U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis,  input-output tape. 
KL  Capital-labor ratio, defined as gross capital stock in 1972 dollars, 
divided by average total employment.  Capital data from unpub- 
lished data, U.S.  Department of Commerce,  Office of Business 
Analysis,  Office of Research  Analysis  and Statistics.  Employ- 
ment data from U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Employment 
and Earnings, various issues. 
PLP  Proportion of total employment  in establishments  with 1,000 or 
more employees.  From U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  1977 Census 
of Manufactures,  Subject Statistics,  vol. I (GPO, 1981). Data for 
1967 were used for equations starting in 1960 and 1970. Data for 
1977 were used for equations starting in 1980. 
SO  Proportion of employment  in the  South  in  1972 as defined by 
Bureau of the Census regions. From U.S.  Bureau of tne Census, 
Census  of Manuifactures, 1972,  Subject  Series:  General  Sum- 
mary, MC72(1)-1 (GPO, 1975). 
UN  Percentage of production workers covered by collective  bargain- 
ing agreements. From Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, 
"New  Estimates  of  Private  Sector  Unionism  in  the  United 
States, " Industrial andLaborRelations  Review, vol. 32 (January 
1979), pp. 143-74. 
Data  on  average  hourly  earnings  for  production  workers  in current 
dollars  are from  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Employment  and 
Earnings, various issues. 
Data on total compensation per employee,  defined as average total salary 
plus employer  compensation  plus other employer  payments  and pro- 106  Brookings Paper s on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
grams,  are from U.S.  Bureau of the  Census,  1981 Annual  Survey of 
Manufactures,  Statistics for Industiy Groups and Industries,  M8 1  (AS)- 
1 (GPO, 1983). 
Data on export shares, defined as ratio of exports to output (all in 1972 
dollars), are from U.S.  Bureau of Economic Analysis,  input-output tape. 
Data on proportion of employment  in the West  in  1972 as defined by 
Bureau of the Census regions. From U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures,  1972, Subject Series:  General Summary,  MC72(1)-1 
(GPO, 1975). Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert M. Solow: The easiest way to explain what Colin and Robert 
Lawrence  are  up to is to translate  their  central  thought  to a more  familiar 
context. Every schoolboy or schoolgirl  knows how to analyze  the profit- 
maximizing  choice of a monopolist  facing a downward-sloping  demand 
curve  and  incurring-for simplicity-constant marginal  costs. You draw 
the demand  curve  and  the  falling  marginal  revenue  curve  that  runs  below 
it. The best price lies on the demand curve at the quantity  at which 
marginal  revenue intersects marginal  cost. If the demand  curve shifts 
back isoelastically, the marginal  revenue curve will shift back propor- 
tionally. The profit-maximizing  monopolist will sell fewer items at a 
lower  price, dividing  his or her  bad  luck between  price  and  quantity.  But 
suppose the demand  curve shifts back and at the same time becomes 
less elastic. Then marginal  revenue  relative  to price is lower than  it used 
to be at every quantity.  (The ratio of marginal  revenue to price is the 
celebrated "one  minus the reciprocal of  the absolute elasticity of 
demand.")  The bright  undergraduate  can easily draw  a diagram  showing 
that  the monopolist's  price  will actually  be higher  than  it was before;  the 
profit-maximizing  quantity  is then very much lower than  it was before. 
Instead  of dividing  his or her bad luck between price and quantity,  the 
monopolist  raises the price and overcompensates  by accepting  a large 
reduction  in quantity  sold. A decrease in demand  is accompanied  by a 
rise in price. 
The Lawrences' story is exactly analogous. During the 1970s and 
1980s,  workers in one group of manufacturing  industries  managed  to 
raise their wages relative to those of workers in other manufacturing 
industries,  despite suffering  a relative  decline in product  demand  and in 
the  derived  demand  for  labor.  Steel is the prototype.  But  all  the industries 
107 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1985 
in question are generally characterized  as concentrated,  capital-inten- 
sive, and unionized. The Lawrences  argue that workers in those indus- 
tries saw the demand curve for their labor shifting adversely,  but also 
becoming  less  elastic.  They responded,  optimally for themselves  as a 
group,  by  imposing  a  relative  wage  increase  and  making  it  stick. 
Employment fell more than it would have if wages had risen less,  stayed 
the same, or fallen. But just as with the monopolist-but  with collective 
utility taking the place  of profit-the  wage  increase  overcompensates 
for the fall in employment. 
There is, of course,  a sound of paradox in this story. But the paradox 
lies in the facts: relative wages did rise in a group of declining industries. 
There is a mythic precedent for the Lawrences'  hypothesis.  Once upon 
a time, long ago, the demand curve for labor in the deep coal mines of 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia more or less collapsed under the impact 
of competition from surface mines in the western states and advancing 
mechanization  in the deep mines.  John L. Lewis  and the United  Mine 
Workers decided  more or less  consciously  not to  resist  the process, 
perhaps even  to go along with it, even  accelerate  it, and to extract in 
return a very generous compensation package for the dwindling number 
of senior miners who remained. Who is to say that they were wrong to 
do so? The Lawrences'  story may be paradoxical, but it is not outlandish. 
But  why  should  the  demand  curve  for  labor  in  those  particular 
industries  have  rotated to become  steeper  while it was  shifting back? 
The argument in the Lawrences'  paper goes like this. One component, 
though only  one,  of the elasticity  of derived  demand for labor comes 
from the substitutability of labor and capital. Capital-intensive industries 
are very  likely  to be characterized  by putty-clay  technologies:  labor- 
capital input proportions in new plants may be fairly sensitive  to input 
prices,  but  once  a  plant  is  designed  and  built,  the  scope  for  input 
substitution diminishes sharply. The Lawrences  conclude that a capital- 
intensive  industry in decline is exactly what their hypothesis  needs: the 
demand curve for labor shifts to the left because product demand shifts 
to the left, and the demand curve for labor becomes  less elastic because, 
with  no  new  plants  being built,  that component  of  substitutability  is 
removed. 
Is this a plausible  story? To begin with,  I have  two  constructively 
critical remarks to make. First, there is a possibly  important element of 
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the reservation wage.  (Changes in the reservation  wage play the same 
role in the labor market that changes in marginal cost play in the familiar 
monopoly  story.) The reservation  wage for steelworkers  and others is 
compounded out of unemployment  insurance, other pension and social 
insurance benefits, wages in alternative employment (if any), and leisure. 
The effective  reservation wage was no doubt changing during the 1970s 
and 1980s, especially as the fortunes of nondecaying industries fluctuated 
with the general business  cycle.  Other things being equal, the wage in 
the Lawrence sector should move with the reservation wage. Part of the 
reservation  wage  effect  is  accounted  for  by  the  behavior  of  relative 
wages;  but I wonder if relative reservation  wages  may not have been 
changing too. If so, that ought to be factored into the analysis. 
That brings me to a second  point.  It is a standard observation  that 
wage differentials (high-low,  union-nonunion)  tend to narrow in good 
years and widen in bad years. Since the Lawrence  sector appears to be 
generally high-wage, one wonders how much of the changing differential 
may be accounted for by this general cyclical relationship. This question 
would  be  unimportant  if  all  industries  were  synchronized  in  their 
business-cycle  fluctuations,  or if the routine cyclical  change  in wage 
differentials were caused by the same factor that the Lawrences  empha- 
size.  There are, however,  other forces  at work: the hoarding of skilled 
labor, the greater ability of organized workers to resist wage cuts in bad 
years and to resist wage drift in good years, and no doubt more. Getting 
a grip on the purely cyclical  component  of the change  in the relative 
wage structure would require some analysis of time series instead of the 
1970 and 1980 cross-sections  of industries.  But the question  should be 
checked out. Maybe a capacity-utilization  variable could be introduced 
into the cross-sections. 
While I am at it, I mention a doctrine-historical observation.  Some of 
the Lawrences' formulas depend on the difference between the elasticity 
of demand for product and the elasticity  of substitution between capital 
and  labor.  Fifty-plus  years  ago,  Hicks  pointed  out  that  Marshall's 
generalization about the derived demand for anything being less elastic, 
the less important that thing is as a fraction of total cost holds provided 
the elasticity of product demand exceeds  the elasticity  of substitution. 
This seems to be the normal case,  by the way.  Pretty surely, the result 
crops up here for the same or a similar reason. Always nice to see an old 
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I really do not know what to say about the regression analysis.  The 
results,  as the Lawrences  point out, are generally consistent  with their 
hypothesis.  (Can it really be true that there has been  nothing special 
about the auto industry's wage behavior in recent years, where "nothing 
special" means that it is unnecessary even to take account of the inroads 
of imports and the correspondingly  sharp fall in capacity  utilization?) 
Obviously  it is  better  that the  results  should  be  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis  than not. What is not clear to me is what power this test has 
against the relevant alternative hypotheses,  whatever they may be. The 
significance of the capital-intensity variable, for example,  might well be 
compatible with other stories. 
Nevertheless,  I end up feeling  that there is some  substance  to the 
Lawrences'  model. In the case of steel wages,  for instance,  it seems to 
come down to a choice between  the Lawrences  and some kind of death 
wish. Lawrence and Lawrence make more sense any time. 
Michael  L.  Wachter:  Colin  and  Robert  Lawrence  have  written  an 
excellent  paper that presents  a novel  approach to the puzzle  of rising 
union wage premiums during the 1970s and early 1980s. This is a critical 
issue,  and the paper has made an important contribution to explaining 
union wage behavior. The Lawrences  argue that union members, deter- 
mining that their industries  are in decline,  bargain to expropriate  the 
difference between  variable cost and price. The union members decide 
that their employers are not going to modernize outdated plants and are 
only awaiting the time when the facilities  no longer help pay the fixed 
cost.  As a quasi-rent, this differential between  variable cost  and price 
can be bargained away. 
To explore  the model and some  of the empirical issues  involved,  I 
would like to comment on four areas. First, did the Lawrences  test the 
end  game  or  slow  game  model?  Second,  is  such  a  model  viable  in 
explaining  industries  other  than manufacturing? Third, does  the  end 
game model introduce rationality into the model in an implausible way? 
Finally, are there other explanations of the rising union wage premiums? 
The Lawrences  do not actually test the theoretical model of the end 
or slow game. The equations are based on a single wage equation model 
that is primarily useful in tracking the increasing union wage premiums. 
Their estimates  do show increasing union wage premiums, and they do 
provide  information on the characteristics  of the industries  subject to 
increasing premiums. Colin Lawrence and Robert Z. Lawrence  111 
A test of the end game or slow game model,  however,  needs  more 
structure. In particular, one must estimate  an output (or employment) 
equation for the particular industries that are presumed to have adopted 
an end game strategy. These equations could then be used to test for two 
critical hypotheses  that are embedded in the end game. 
First, for the end game to  make  sense,  it must be  shown  that the 
decline in industry-specific output would have been a reasonable forecast 
by  the  parties  involved  in  collective  bargaining in  the  early  1970s. 
Obviously,  absent a pessimistic  forecast of industry decline,  the unions 
would not adopt an end game strategy. The unions' published literature 
might have evidence  on this point.  Alternatively,  the more traditional 
strategy could be adopted-that  is, to reestimate the output equation for 
the time period ending in the early  1970s and then to make an out-of- 
sample forecast for the period through 1984. 
Second,  it must be shown  that the output decline  itself was largely 
independent of the existence  of the union wage premiums. The basis of 
the end game theory is that the output decline would have occurred in 
any case, and that the unions were responding to this environment when 
they sought and attained higher wage premiums. 
In other words, the test of the end game hypothesis is largely dependent 
on results obtained from an output equation. The Lawrences  have not, 
however,  estimated such an equation. Their equations,  which have the 
wage premium as the dependent  variable, only  show which industries 
were potentially in play as slow game or end game industries. That the 
Lawrences have not rigorously tested their model restricts the interpre- 
tation that the reader can make of their empirical results,  but the more 
important contribution of their paper is the exposition  of the end game 
model itself. 
If the Lawrences'  model were tested in terms of the output equations, 
the results might well  confirm the basic  hypotheses  in some  areas of 
manufacturing such as primary metals,  transportation equipment,  ma- 
chinery, and fabricated metals. These industries had fallen on hard times 
by the early 1970s and have declined further over the past ten years. 
Whether these developments  could have been arrested by aggressive 
attention to wage costs  is important, although difficult, to determine. If 
relative labor costs existing during the late 1960s had already made these 
industries  noncompetitive,  then  the  actions  of  the  1970s cannot  be 
viewed as a new strategy, that is, a strategy designed to gain the quasi- 
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during the 1960s were an important part of the industries' problems, then 
the slow game strategy was in place much earlier than the 1970s, perhaps 
even  from the late  1930s or the early  1950s. This,  by the way,  is not 
implausible. With respect to the industrial unions in manufacturing, the 
only  significant period when  union wage  premiums declined  was  the 
1960s. Perhaps the unions experimented  with the neoclassical  model of 
stationary premiums, found it wanting, and then continued to increase 
relative wages. 
The  second  question  concerns  whether  the  model  can  be  applied 
outside  of  manufacturing.  Although  the  Lawrences  argue  that their 
model is not industry-specific,  I do not believe  that it can be plausibly 
applied to the other heavily  unionized  industries in the United  States, 
that is, regulated sectors  (such as transportation and communication), 
mining, and construction. 
Of these three broad groupings, union wage premiums were growing 
most strongly in the regulated industries,  which by no means conform 
to the end game hypothesis.  They are not dying, and to the extent that 
employment  is  falling,  the  decline  is  concentrated  in  the  unionized 
sectors.  Deregulation  and the associated  direct competition  from non- 
union firms are the major threats to the financial health and employment 
levels  of the unionized firms in these industries. 
Thus, to explain increasing premiums in the regulated sector requires 
a  different  industry-sector  story.  Increasing  union  wage  premiums 
cannot  be  viewed  as  a  rational  response  by  unions  to  a  decline  in 
employment that would have occurred in any case. 
In construction,  union wage premiums actually declined  during the 
1970s. In mining, premiums held steady. The construction story is again 
sector-specific.  There,  union  wage  premiums  increased  dramatically 
during the early 1970s and then declined thereafter. The interesting part 
of the construction  story is that most of these  industries are on a short 
contract cycle and frequently do not have COLAs. Hence the importance 
of  COLAs  to  the  current  problems  in  manufacturing  and  regulated 
industries-both  sectors  with  strong  COLA  clauses-should  not  be 
discarded too readily. 
In construction and mining, as in the regulated industries, competition 
from nonunion firms is causing employment  losses  to unionized  firms. 
Again, relative union wages are a key exogenous  causal link. 
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attempting to apply the end game model too broadly is not useful.  The 
model simply cannot be used  to explain  economywide  developments 
while  retaining its  unique  characteristics.  It  needs  to  be  applied  to 
industries that are in decline,  and the U.S.  economy,  overall, is simply 
not declining. 
The Lawrences  attempt to iuse the slow game version to explain the 
economywide  evidence  of the  1970s. But the  1970s, after all,  were  a 
prolonged  cyclical  phenomenon.  And  in a cyclical  downturn,  union 
assaults on the quasi-rents of the capital stock would not be a reasonable 
strategy.  The  notion  that  union  members  and  their  leaders  are  so 
shortsighted as to destroy  their employers  in the midst of a prolonged 
cyclical  downturn is too  irrational to be believable.  Hence  I think the 
case is strongest when application of the end game version of the model 
is limited to relevant industries in the manufacturing sector. 
The third issue is the extent to which the Lawrences'  story introduces 
rationality in an asymmetric  way.  The usual view  is that firms and not 
workers  have  an asymmetric  information  advantage  with  respect  to 
industry demand conditions.  Ex post,  it is clear that industries such as 
steel, autos, and machinery appear to be in a period of long-term decline. 
But the Lawrences'  story is that farsighted unionists may have decided 
in the early 1970s that their employers'  decline was inevitable and that a 
higher wage premium would secure quasi-rents with little employment 
or allocational effects. 
But if this was the case,  the unionists  clearly had more insight than 
the  managers.  For  example,  steel  industry  management  signed  the 
experimental no-strike provision with the view that the industry's woes 
were due to strike-induced supply interruptions and not to high wages. 
Indeed  that  settlement  was  heralded  as  a forerunner  of  agreements 
elsewhere,  of a labor relations system that had finally come of age. 
Hence,  the Lawrences'  story suggests that the unions knew that the 
end  game  was  in  effect,  but  were  not  telling  their  counterparts  in 
management, who were incorrectly processing  their own private infor- 
mation. 
Anothier puzzle  with  respect  to  asymmetric  information  concerns 
asymmetric power.  Even  if unions  were  interested  in management's 
capital quasi-rents,  why  would  union leaders  assume  that they  could 
secure  them?  The  ability  of  management  to  withstand  strikes  (for 
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1970s. Unions were no better able to impose unilateral settlements  then 
than they had been in the 1960s. Hence,  what is the basis for assuming 
that they could secure the quasi-rents? 
Indeed, management can play the end game as well as workers can. 
Why did management  not attempt to  secure  the quasi-rents from the 
workers? As is well known, specifically trained workers in manufacturing 
generate bilateral monopoly conditions that have an uncertain outcome. 
Workers and management  are viewed  as  splitting that game  so  as to 
encourage efficient levels  of specific training. The existence  of deferred 
compensation and the likelihood that wages exceed  marginal productiv- 
ity in the later years of employment  create a pool of worker rents. It is 
assumed that management will not renege and usurp those rents in the 
interest of maintaining a reputation as a good employer.  If the end is in 
sight, however,  the need to maintain that reputation is gone. 
That union power at the picket line was already declining during the 
1970s and that workers also owned quasi-rents are major problems for 
the end game model. Were unions rational agents, processing information 
more efficiently than management? Was management simply irrational? 
Was management playing the "good  guy,"  unwilling to strike back at 
worker quasi-rents in the face of union demands for capital quasi-rents? 
Finally,  are there other explanations  of increasing union wage pre- 
miums? I believe  that there are, especially  if we do not require a single 
theory for all the sectors.  The one that I have suggested puts more stress 
on analyzing the contractual nature of the bargaining process.  Although 
the traditional approach is to look at union-management contracts as a 
discrete  version  of  the  spot  labor market that must be negotiated  de 
novo, this is a mistake. Contract expirations are not really the end of the 
contract. Rather, they are complicated reopeners.  Little of the existing 
contract is changed.  Minor tinkering occurs  to reflect new conditions, 
but the party that wants to change the language, for example  to strike 
the COLA clause,  has a difficult job ahead.  Changing the language or 
the structure of the contract is treated as a major challenge and in this 
sense  is more akin to contract breach than to a simple rewriting of an 
expired contract. 
Given uncertainty as to future labor market conditions,  the collective 
bargaining contract  apportions  the  risks  between  the parties.  COLA 
clauses,  in part, work as a device for distributing risk. Given the actual 
supply shocks that occurred, the COLA clauses forced management to 
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A current  difficulty  facing  the collective bargaining  parties,  however, 
is how to deal with  the resulting  shift  in relative  wages and  costs. Facing 
employment  declines,  which  result  in  part  from  the expanding  premiums, 
the parties must renegotiate  the basic contract itself. This may be a 
difficult  task, given the utility  loss to workers  in reducing  the premium. 
But if the unions  determine  that  this is too costly, they must  then absorb 
a long-run  adjustment  to a lower employment  base. In other  words, it is 
only niown  that  unions must decide whether  or not to adopt  an end game 
strategy. 
General Discussion 
Wayne  Vroman  reported  on his own work  analyzing  individual  union 
wage settlements  over an extended period. Using the resulting  data, he 
has found little or no effect in subsequent settlements of unexpected 
cost-of-living  adjustments:  inflationary  surprises  appear  to create per- 
manent  windfalls  in wages. Although such behavior might be hard to 
explain  in a conventional  bargaining  model, Vroman  found  it a plausible 
cause of the rapid wage increases during  the 1970s in manufacturing 
industries  with COLAs, since inflation  was repeatedly  underpredicted 
during  this period. He suggested that a variable allowing for cost-of- 
living adjustments should be included in regressions such as those 
presented  in the Lawrences' paper. Robert Lawrence  pointed out that 
the COL  variable  (proportion  of workers  covered by COLAs)  failed to 
add  to the explanatory  power of the cross-section  equations. 
Angus Deaton reasoned that the substitution between union and 
nonunion labor may be more important  in explaining growing wage 
dispersion  than the capital-labor  substitution  that the authors  stressed 
in their model. He noted that unions have been losing representation 
and conjectured  that the aggressive substitution  of nonunion  for union 
workers  might  be holding  down average  wages in some industries. 
Lawrence  Summers  found the end game and slow game hypotheses 
plausible  and noted that they appeared  to explain  historical  episodes of 
large wage increases in coal and railroads when employment was 
declining  in those industries. He also noted that scooping may have 
worked  in reverse  when  airlines  were deregulated  and  became  free to fly 
anywhere.  Although  deregulation  expanded  the demand  for labor  in the 
industry,  the elasticity of demand also increased and wages declined 
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slow game require monopoly  power by labor, so that the failure of the 
unionization variable to help explain wage developments  is an important 
finding against the end game and slow game hypotheses.  Robert Law- 
rence replied that in the sample of industries analyzed,  80 percent of the 
workers were unionized, so that the variance in unionization by industry 
may not have been great enough to reveal the importance of unions. 
Jeffrey Sachs  suggested  that the Lawrences'  model might help ex- 
plain rapid wage increases in Europe during the 1970s, though he pointed 
out  important institutional  differences  among  countries  that make  it 
difficult to  test  the  model  on  the  basis  of  distinctions  such  as  union 
versus nonunion wage gains. In the United Kingdom, for example,  the 
gap between  union and nonunion wages widened through 1981 despite 
weak or declining employment  in many unionized  industries,  a devel- 
opment consistent  with the Lawrences'  model.  In West Germany,  by 
contrast,  where  many  industries'  union  settlements  are formally  ex- 
tended  to  nonunion  firms,  there  is  simply  no  evidence  on  union- 
nonunion differentials. 